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Introduction
An important branch of finance is the one concerned with derivative pricing. Derivatives
are financial instruments whose price depends on the value of an underlying asset.
A popular example of this type of product is a European equity call option, i.e. a
contract that guarantees the owner the right to buy at a future time a certain stock at a
price fixed at the deal’s inception. In mathematical finance, pricing a derivative means
finding a price for the contract consistently with all the available market’s quotations
avoiding arbitrage opportunities, i.e. investment strategies that make a profit at no risk
and without net initial investment of capital (Delbaen and Schachermayer [2004]). In
this work we focus on interest rate derivatives, namely contracts written on interest
rates, which give the holder the possibility to borrow or lend an amount of money at a
certain interest rate locked at inception.
After the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 credit events involving major banks
such as Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac lead the market to pay great
attention to credit and liquidity risk. Credit risk is the risk due to credit events such as
default or change in the credit quality, while liquidity risk reflects difficulties in closing
a position due to market illiquidity or the risk of not being able to borrow money at
a convenient rate to finance itself. Bank regulators had stressed the importance of a
reliable measurement of credit and liquidity risk as reported for instance in the recent
change in Basel documentation. Today no institution can be considered risk-free. In
particular there is a risk that a party would suffer a loss because of the default of its
counterparty, which will not be able to wholly repay its debt (if any) to the surviving
party. Hence every entity is charged a premium while borrowing money because of its
default risk. This leads to an increment in the cost of funding which in turn increase
default risk (Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]). Credit and liquidity risk also have an
impact on interest rate quotes. In particular, we witnessed a shift from a market where
lending money for a certain period of time nT was almost equivalent to rolling n times
a loan with maturity T , to a market where this is not true anymore.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the role of counterparty risk while pricing
a defaultable contract, i.e. a contract between two risky parties, in a multi-curve
framework. From a modeling perspective we have to include the changes brought by
the Credit Crunch. In particular is not possible to only account for market risks (e.g
vii
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changes in rates) but we need a default model for any product (Brigo et al. [2013b]).
Moreover the presence of funding costs (different for any product and any counterparty)
requires a revised arbitrage-free pricing framework (see Bielecki and Rutkowski [2014]).
For what concerns interest rate models we have to follow the shift of the market and
move from a framework that models a single rate and derives the others by no arbitrage
formulas (referred to as single-curve), to a framework that consistently models the
dynamics of rates of different tenors (called multi-curve, Henrard [2014]). In this work
we consider products that can be completely or partially financed by assets posted
by each party involved in a deal as a guarantee for its default, leaving to further
developments a thorough treatment of financing costs. Usually works on counterparty
risk use stylized interest rate models, often in a single-curve framework; hence we
had to transport their key ideas in a more realistic multi-curve framework, able to
replicate market prices. Besides amalgamating the existing literature in a consistent
way, our contribution is twofold: primarily, the consistent theoretical merge of a default
aware pricing model with a multi-curve interest rate framework. Secondly, having
thoroughly tested numerically the impact of our extension to the pricing of an interest
rate swap. We put a lot of effort into combining several recent works on counterparty
risk such as Brigo et al. [2013b], Crépey et al. [2014], Pallavicini et al. [2011], Pallavicini
et al. [2012] and Brigo and Pallavicini [2014] with the literature on pricing in presence
of default risk (Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002], Jeanblanc et al. [2009]). To implement
a post-2007 interest rate framework, we exploited the ideas presented in Moreni and
Pallavicini [2013] and Moreni and Pallavicini [2014]. Similar ideas can be also found
in Henrard [2014], Crépey et al. [2013]. Some articles that are similar in spirit to this
thesis are the following: Brigo and Pallavicini [2014], that has been a great source of
ideas, since it provides a thorough analysis (also a numerical one) of default aware
pricing in a partially single-curve interest rate model; Pallavicini and Brigo [2013] that
develops a theoretical pricing framework for defaultable derivatives in a multi-curve
setup; Crépey et al. [2013] that computes prices of defaultable interest rate instruments
in a multi-curve model specification. Our findings confirm the relevance of default
risk while pricing a contract and highlight the difficulties that must be overcome while
using a realistic multi-curve framework.
We now give a brief overview of structure of the thesis. In the first chapter we
mainly discuss two different default modeling approaches with their mathematical
foundations: the structural approach that aims to link the default event of an entity to
its financial fundamentals, and the reduced form approach that models the default as
an unpredictable event determined by a force external to the market.
In the second chapter we review the martingale pricing theory and extend it to
account for the default risk following Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002]. Then following
viii
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Crépey et al. [2014] we introduce the Total Valuation Adjustment, i.e. an adjustment to
the risk-free price of a contract that accounts for counterparty risk. We do this by steps,
increasing the complexity of the model in order to better approximate the real market
conditions. At the end of the chapter we derive a pricing formula for defaultable
contracts, that is suitable for numerical purposes.
In the third chapter we make another step through real market practice. We start
describing different ways to model closeout valuation, i.e. the procedure that happens
upon default to establish the value of the defaulted contract. Then, following Brigo and
Pallavicini [2014], we proceed to illustrate the details of a diffused practice to alleviate
default risk, collateral margining. Then we derive a more general version of the pricing
formula of chapter 2 that takes into account the cure period, i.e. the time needed to
complete the default procedure. We end the chapter with a section devoted to modeling
trades mediated by a Central Counterparty , which is an entity that provides clearing
and settlement services for financial transactions.
We proceed with the fourth chapter in which we deal with interest rate modeling.
We give an overview of pre-crisis interest rate modeling and we give a deeper look at
the models we used for our numerical simulations. We then describe our choice for a
multi-curve interest rate framework following Moreni and Pallavicini [2013].
In the final chapter we review the techniques used for the numerical investigations.
After a sketch of the calibration of interest rate and default models to market quotes,
finally we extensively comment our numerical findings and their financial implication.
In particular we analyze how our findings in a multi-curve framework relate to the
single curve ones of Brigo and Pallavicini [2014].
The thesis concludes with a hint at further developments.
ix
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CHAPTER 1
Credit models
1.1 Counterparty risk
Counterparty risk is the risk that a party will suffer a loss due to the default or the
worsening of the credit quality of its counterparty in a contract.
Definition 1.1.1. A default is a situation that occurs when an entity fails to comply some
condition in a debt contract, isn’t able to pay its debt or restructurates it.
Example 1.1.2. Suppose that a bank and a corporate have a contract, then what happens
if the corporate defaults? Basically the present value of the contract is calculated; if it’s
positive to the corporate the bank will have to pay it to the liquidators of the defaulted
company. If on the other side the value is negative to the bank, the corporate usually
will not be able to completely repay its debt (we supposed that the corporate just
defaulted) and so the bank will recover only a fraction of the contract’s value.
Usually the situations that imply that a party has defaulted are defined in the ISDA
master agreement, a standard contract commonly used to regulate OTC derivatives. In
this document is also explained how to calculate the value of the contract at default
time. Moreover the ISDA master agreement allows parties to net out their exposures
while calculating what the parties owe to each other. Hence we assume that if the entity
C defaults, the value of each contract in which C is involved is computed, and if the
value is positive for the defaulted company, then the counterparty must pay the whole
value. If instead the value of the contract is negative to C only a fraction of its debt will
be refunded to the counterparty.
In particular we want to model when does a default happen. We usually name τ
the the default time of some financial entity, and we call loss given default, LGD, the
fraction of the debt that the defaulted firm won’t be able to pay to its creditors and
REC = 1 − LGD the refunded portion of the debit. In the following section we give a
concise introduction to the mathematical modeling of default.
1
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1.1.1 Mathematical framework
We now illustrate some of the assumptions that are useful when dealing with default
modeling. In the following we assume that all the filtrations introduced satisfy the
usual conditions, and all the random variables presented satisfy suitable integrability
conditions to evaluate functionals described in the following. We start by considering
a complete probability space (Ω,A ,Q). As usual the sigma algebra A represents the
family of events we take in consideration in our model, Q is usually called the risk
neutral probability.
Remark 1.1.3. We choose the risk neutral probability Q for convenience of notation but
we stress that in this chapter we don’t use any of its properties. Moreover we will
introduce its proper definition in the following chapters.
We endow our probability space with a filtration G = (Gt)06t<∞ where Gt represents
all the information available at time t. A usual choice is to model the default time τ as
a non negative random variable on the space (Ω,A ,Q) such that Q[τ = t] = 0 for all t.
We postulate that Q[τ =∞] = 0 and is convenient to assume Q[τ > t] > 0 for all t ∈ R+.
These assumption have the economic interpretation that the probability of defaulting
shouldn’t be concentrated in a particular instant of time, that the the probability that
default never occurs is zero and that there is no reason to assume that default will
occur for sure before a fixed time t.
Definition 1.1.4. We say that the process Ht = 1{τ6t} is the default process associated to τ.
Moreover we call H = (Ht)t>0 the filtration generated by Ht i.e. Ht = σ(Hu | u 6 t).
We further assume that exists a filtration F = (Ft)t>0 such that G = F ∨ H i.e.
Gt = σ(Ft,Ht). Moreover we define Ft = Q[τ 6 t | Ft].
Remark 1.1.5. The filtration H contains the information about default, on the other
hand F is used to model the default free information. We note that F is not uniquely
determined by H and G. As an example if we set G = H then we can choose F to be
any sub-filtration of H.
The following lemma (taken from Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002] Section 5.1) is a
step forward in understanding how the information expressed by G relates to the one
expressed by F.
Lemma 1.1.6. Let G∗ = (G ∗t )t>0 where
G ∗t = {A ∈ A | ∃B ∈ Ft, A ∩ {τ > t} = B ∩ {τ > t}}
then G ⊆ G∗ which means Gt ⊆ G ∗t .
2
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Proof. We can easily see that G∗ is a sub sigma-field of A , then what is sufficient to
check is that Ft,Ht ⊆ G ∗t . We prove the result if we can find a set B ∈ Ft, such that
we have A ∩ {τ > t} = B ∩ {τ > t} for any set A of the form A = {τ 6 u} for some u 6 t,
or A ∈ Ft. Of course this is possible by choosing B = ∅ in the first case and B = A in
the second.
An important result (see Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002]) is the following:
Lemma 1.1.7. For any A -measurable random variable X and any t ∈ R+, we have:
E[1{τ>t}X | Gt] = 1{τ>t}
E[1{τ>t}X | Ft]
Q[τ > t | Ft]
. (1.1.1)
In particular we have that for any Gt-measurable random variable Y there exists an Ft-
measurable random variable Z such that
1{τ>t}Y = 1{τ>t}Z.
Proof. To prove the result we rearrange 1.1.1 in a more convenient way to obtain:
E[Q[τ > t | Ft]1{τ>t}X | Gt] = E[1{τ>t}E[1{τ>t}X | Ft] | Gt]. (1.1.2)
To prove 1.1.2 we show that for every A ∈ Gt, in virtue of Lemma 1.1.6, we have for
some B in Ft∫
A
Q[τ > t | Ft]1{τ>t}XdQ =
∫
A∩{τ>t}
Q[τ > t | Ft]XdQ =
∫
B∩{τ>t}
Q[τ > t | Ft]XdQ
=
∫
B
Q[τ > t | Ft]1{τ>t}XdQ =
∫
B
Q[τ > t | Ft]E[1{τ>t}X | Ft]dQ
=
∫
B
E[1{τ>t}E[1{τ>t}X | Ft] | Ft]dQ =
∫
B∩{τ>t}
E[1{τ>t}X | Ft]dQ
=
∫
A∩{τ>t}
E[1{τ>t}X | Ft]dQ =
∫
A
1{τ>t}E[1{τ>t}X | Ft]dQ.
Which is what we needed.
We give a proposition (borrowed from Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002]) which will
be useful when dealing with particular defaultable contracts.
Theorem 1.1.8. Let Zx be a bounded, F-predictable process. Then for any t < s 6∞ we have:
E[1{t<τ6s}Zτ | Gt] =
1{τ>t}
Q[τ > t | Ft]
E
[∫
(t,s]
ZudFu | Ft
]
(1.1.3)
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Proof. By noting that 1{τ>t}1{s>τ>t} = 1{s>τ>t} we can apply formula 1.1.1 to obtain:
E[1{t<τ6s}Zτ | Gt] =
1{τ>t}
Q[τ > t | Ft]
E
[
1{t<τ6s}Zτ | Ft
]
.
Thus what remains to be proved is that
E
[
1{t<τ6s}Zτ | Ft
]
= E
[∫
(t,s]
ZudFu | Ft
]
. (1.1.4)
To achieve our result we use an approximation argument. We start proving the
formula (1.1.4) in the case Zx is a step-wise F-predictable process. Thus we can write
Zu =
∑n
i=0 Zti1{ti<u6ti+1} for t < u 6 s where t = t0 < · · · < tn + 1 = s and Zti is an
Fti-measurable random variable. Hence
E
[
1{t<τ6s}Zτ | Ft
]
= E
[
n∑
i=0
Zti1{ti<τ6ti+1} | Ft
]
=
n∑
i=0
E
[
E
[
Zti1{ti<τ6ti+1} | Fti+1
]
| Ft
]
= E
[
n∑
i=0
Zti(Fti+1 − Fti) | Ft
]
= E
[∫
(t,s]
ZudFu | Ft
]
.
Now we can approximate any bounded F-predictable process with a sequence of
step-wise F-predictable processes and use a convergence argument to complete the
proof.
The following result, similar to Theorem 1.1.8, is taken from Bielecki et al. [2009].
Theorem 1.1.9. Let Zx be a predictable process and let τ be a G-stopping time. Then
E
[∫T∧τ
t∧τ
Zudu | Gt
]
=
1{τ>t}
Q[τ > t|Ft]
E
[∫T
t
ZuQ[τ > u|Fu]du | Ft
]
, (1.1.5)
if the right term of the equation is well defined.
In the following sections we are going to see examples of default modeling. The
basic idea behind them is the following. We choose a stochastic process and a barrier.
The barrier can be anything, from a deterministic value to a stochastic process. Then
we define the default time τ as the first time that the process crosses the barrier. The
main difference between the models we are going to illustrate is if τ is F- measurable
or not. In the former case we speak of structural models and in the latter of Reduced form
models.
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1.2 Structural models
This type of model is also called firm value approach because the main idea behind
these models is that default occurs when the value of the firm (supposed to be the
sum of the firm’s equity and the firm’s debt) reaches a certain lower barrier. So the
value Vt is usually modeled as a stochastic process that satisfies a stochastic differential
equation. The first description of this kind of model appeared in a work by Merton
[1974].
1.2.1 Merton’s model
The simplest firm value model is Merton’s model. In this case we don’t really model τ,
instead we only check if at a certain time T (the debt maturity), the firm’s value VT is
over a lower bound L. We can imagine that a company issued a bond with maturity T
to finance itself and so at time T the company will have to pay the bond holders. We
assume the following dynamic for the value process under the probability Q:
dVt = (r− k)Vtdt+ σVtdWt (1.2.1)
where all parameters are assumed constant for simplicity, r is the risk free interest
rate, k is a dividend yield, and σ is the volatility of the value process. Wt is the standard
Wiener process. The solution to equation (1.2.1) is :
Vt = V0 exp
((
r− k−
σ2
2
)
+ σWt
)
.
The hypothesis of a log-normal distribution for the firm’s value conforms with market
data according to Crouhy et al. [2000]. It hence follows from the assumption on the
value’s distribution that the survival probability Q{VT > L} is equal to:
1 −Φ
(
log LV0 − (r− k−
σ2
2 )T
σ
√
T
)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable.
Theorem 1.2.1. The price of the equity of the firm is equal to the Black-Scholes price of a call
option on the value of the firm (Black and Scholes [1973]), i.e.
St = VtΦ(d1) − e
−r(T−t)LΦ(d2).
Where d1 =
ln(VtL )+(r−k+
σ2
2 )(T−t)
σ
√
T−t
and d2 = d1 − σ
√
T − t.
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Proof. Since one of the model’s assumption is that the value of the firm is equal to the
sum of equity and debt we have Vt = Dt + St. We can obtain
Dt = E[e
−r(T−t) min(VT ,L)|Ft]
= e−r(T−t)L− E[(L− VT )
+ |Ft] = e
−r(T−t)L− Putt(K, T ,V(t),σ)
where Putt(K, T ,V(t)) is the price at time t of a put option with maturity T , strike L
and underlying asset Vt. Hence we have St = Vt − e−r(T−t)L+ Putt(K, T ,V(t),σ) and
we conclude by the Put-Call parity property and by the Black-Scholes option pricing
formula.
Remark 1.2.2. The proposition we just have stated gives a way to estimate the firm
value volatility σ. In fact this parameter is not really observable but can be linked to
the equity volatility after some calculations obtaining σS = σ∆Call VtSt . An extensive
derivation of this formula can be found in Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002].
The model we just illustrated is very simple, and one of the possible extension is
the following:
1.2.2 Black and Cox’s model
In this model we again think of default as not being able to pay the owner of a bond
with maturity T , but differently from what we do in Merton model, we allow default to
happen also before T . To do so we define a lower barrier Ht that if crossed by the value
process determines the default of the firm. This can be interpreted as the option for
the stakeholders to start bankruptcy procedures if the situation is bad for the company.
The dynamic of the value process is the same as in the Merton model.
Ht =
{
L if t = T
Ke−γ(T−t) t < T
with Ke−γ(T−t) 6 Le−r(T−t). The default time is then defined as
τ = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] | Vt 6 Ht}
so it is the first passage time through the barrier Ht. Of course this choice makes
possible to use some tools typical of barrier option pricing. To obtain the distribution
of the default time, we use a slightly technical lemma (proved in Bielecki et al. [2009])
which is a consequence of Girsanov theorem and of the Wiener process reflection
principle.
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Lemma 1.2.3. Given ν and σ real constants and taken Wt, a Wiener process under the
probability measure Q we have for every x < 0:
Q
(
inf
06u6s
Wu >
x− νu
σ
)
= Φ
(
−x+ νs
σ
√
s
)
− e
2νx
σ2 Φ
(
x+ νs
σ
√
s
)
.
Using this lemma we obtain the following proposition (Bielecki and Rutkowski
[2002]) that characterizes the law of the default time τ in the Black Cox model.
Theorem 1.2.4. Let Vt,Ht, τ be respectively the value process, the barrier and the default time
in the Black Cox model, then we have:
Q (τ 6 s) = Φ
(
ln H0V0 − νs
σ
√
s
)
−
(
H0
V0
)2a
Φ
(
ln H0V0 + νs
σ
√
s
)
where ν = r− k− γ− 12σ
2 and a = ν
σ2
.
Proof. We have
Q (τ 6 s) = Q
(
inf
06u6s
Vu > Hu
)
,
since the logarithm is a monotonic function we have
Q (τ 6 s) = Q
(
inf
06u6s
σWu > (−r+ k+
1
2
σ2)u− γ(T − u) + ln
(
K
V0
))
.
We then obtain the thesis by applying Lemma 1.2.3 with ν = r − k − γ − 12σ
2 and
x = ln(K) − γT − ln(V0).
With this model we overcome the restriction of the Merton mode of having only a
possible default time. Moreover in the following we will add some more randomness to
our models. This will allow a more precise calibration to market data. We now describe
two more advanced models by following Brigo et al. [2011a].
1.2.3 AT1P model
The Analytically Tractable First Passage model uses the following dynamic for Vt:
dVt = (rt − kt)Vtdt+ σtVtdWt
The parameters depend upon time (rt,kt,σt). Moreover we assume a barrier
Ht = H exp(
∫t
0
(ru − ku − Bσ
2
u)du).
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The default time τ is the first time the barrier is crossed, so we have
τ = inf{t > 0 | Vt 6 Ht}.
Also in this model the survival probability can be computed analytically due to
recent advances in barrier option pricing (see Brigo and Tarenghi [2009], Lo et al. [2003]
and references therein). So the formula we obtain is:
Q{τ > s} =
[
Φ
(
log V0H +
2B−1
2 Θ√
Θ
)
−
(
H
V0
)2B−1
Φ
(
log HV0 +
2B−1
2 Θ√
Θ
)]
(1.2.2)
Where Θ =
∫s
0 σ
2
udu.
Remark 1.2.5. We may notice that in the formula (1.2.2), V0 is only present in the term
V0
H and the same is true for H. This being the case one can set V0 = 1 and express H as
a portion of the firm value so we do not have to guess the real value of the firm and
we can express the barrier initial value as a fraction of it. Moreover the barrier can be
expressed in a more meaningful way:
Ht =
H
V0
E[Vt]exp
(
−B
∫t
0
σ2udu
)
we see that the barrier is proportional to the expected value of the firm by the constant
ratio H/V0 times a term that can modify it as the volatility changes.
As noted in Brigo et al. [2013b], the model behaves quite well but its scarce ran-
domness prevents it to consistently represent cases in which there is an high default
probability in the short term. The details about this problem can also be found in Brigo
et al. [2011a].
After this premise the next model we introduce seems like a natural generalization
of the AT1P.
1.2.4 SBTV model
The Scenario Based Time-varying Volatility model is an evolution of the AT1P model that
takes into account the possible market uncertainty on a firm’s health by means of a
scenario based barrier. More precisely we define
HIt = H
I exp
(∫t
0
(ru − ku − Bσ
2
u)du
)
where the real random variable HI assumes the values Hi, i ∈ {1, · · · ,N} with probabil-
ity pi such that
∑
i pi = 1. The different Hi represent the different barrier in different
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possible scenarios. The dynamic of the firm’s value is the same as in the AT1P model
and thus the default time is defined as
τ = inf{t > 0 | Vt 6 HIt}.
Example 1.2.6. One can consider HI to assume values H1 = 0.4 and H2 = 0.8. In this
case H1 will model the default risk scenario due to a tighter barrier, instead H2 would
represent a less risky situation.
Remark 1.2.7. We end this section observing that in all the structural models presented
here, the default time τ is an F stopping time. This is due to the fact that we define it
in an endogenous way, as the first time an F adapted, continuous process hits a certain
region of the space. The next class of model that we present tries to give an alternative
representation of the default time.
1.3 Reduced form models
Reduced form models are different from structural ones because they model the
default time as an exogenous event, not derived by observable market quantities. In
the literature we can distinguish two main approaches to reduced form modeling
(Jeanblanc and Le Cam [2007]), the intensity based one and the hazard process one. In the
following we borrow from Jeanblanc and Le Cam [2007], Bielecki et al. [2009], Bielecki
et al. [2006], Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002]. A deep and wide description of the topics
concerning reduced form models can be found in the works just mentioned.
1.3.1 Intensity versus hazard process approach
In the intensity approach we endow our probability space with a filtration G = (Gt)t>0
and we let τ be a G-stopping time. Hence we have that the process Ht = 1{τ6t} is a
G-adapted, increasing càdlàg process, hence a sub-martingale. Then by means of the
Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem (Karatzas [1991]) there exist a unique G-predictable
increasing process At such that
Mt = Ht −At
is a martingale. We note that because of the form of Ht we have At = At∧τ. Further-
more it is usually assumed that At =
∫t
0 λ
G
udu for a G-adapted, non-negative process
λGu. This process is usually referred at as the intensity rate.
In the hazard process approach we suppose the existence of a default-free filtration F
such that τ is not an F-stopping time. We define G = F ∨H where H = (Ht)t>0 and
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Ht = σ(Hs, s 6 t), where Ht = 1{τ6t}. We then consider the process Ft = Q[τ 6 t |Ft],
since it’s increasing and F-adapted, it is an F-sub-martingale, and admits a Doob-Meyer
decomposition Ft = Nt + Bt where Nt is an F-martingale and Bt is a predictable
increasing process. It can be shown (see Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002]) that the process
M ′t = Ht −
∫t∧τ
0
dBs
1 − Fs_
(1.3.1)
is a G-martingale, and that the integral is indeed an increasing process, and so by the
uniqueness of At we obtain At =
∫t∧τ
0
dBs
1−Fs_
. If we assume that dBt = btdt, as we
have done for At, we have
λGt = 1{t<τ}λ
F
t
where λF = bt1−Ft− is called F-intensity rate. In the following we postulate that
Assumption 1.3.1 (H). We assume that every F-local martingale is also a G-local
martingale.
This condition, called the (H) hypothesis is widely used and under this assumption
the two approaches described become more similar. A precise treatment of this
hypothesis and its consequences is outside the scope of this thesis and we refer to the
books cited at the beginning of section 1.3 for more details.
1.3.2 Multi-name
In this section we give an idea on how intensity models deal with the possibility of
multiple defaults. We fix a filtered probability space (Ω,A ,Q,F = (Ft)t>0), and
we consider two entities I and C involved in some type of contract. Moreover we
introduce two default times τI, τC. We explicitly exclude the possibility of a perfectly
simultaneous default, namely Q[τI = τC] = 0. We next introduce the functions HXt =
1{τX6t} and the correspondent filtrations H
X = (H Xt )t>0 where H
X
t = σ(H
X
s | s 6 t).
The whole information on default times is then contained in the filtration H = HI∨HC.
As we did before, we call G = F ∨ H the filtration that contains all the information
available. To see what happened when one of the parties default it makes sense to
define
τ = min{τI, τC}.
We can make some assumptions on the joint distribution of (τI, τC). As an example
consider the case in which the default times are mutually independent under the
probability Q. In this case we have
Q[τC 6 t, τI 6 t] = Q[τC 6 t]Q[τI 6 t],
10
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hence
F(t) = Q[τ 6 t] = Q[τC 6 t, τI 6 t] = Q[τC 6 t]Q[τI 6 t] = FI(t)FC(t),
where F(t), FI(t), FC(t) are the cumulative distribution functions of τ, τI, τC respectively.
Another less restrictive choice that can be made for the dependence of τI, τC is the so
called conditional independence (this will be our main choice in the following chapters).
Definition 1.3.2. We say that the random times τI, τC are conditionally independent
with respect to F if for any s > 0 and arbitrary tI, tC ∈ [0, s] we have
Q[τI > tI, τC > tC | Fs] = Q[τI > tI | Fs]Q[τC > tC | Fs]
.
Remark 1.3.3. Conditional independence models the fact that I and C are subject to
common risk factors (embedded in the F information) and risks specific for each
name. So after filtering with respect to the common information, default events are
independent.
We now follow Bielecki et al. [2009] Section 3.8 in deriving a formula that will be
useful in the following chapters. We now choose the hazard process approach as seen
in 1.3.1 and we define λIt and λ
C
t as the F-intensity rates of respectively τI and τC.
Theorem 1.3.4. Let τ = min{τI, τC} and ZIx,ZCx be bounded F-predictable processes, then we
have:
E
[
1{t<τ=τI6T}Z
I
τ + 1{t<τ=τC6T}Z
C
τ |Gt]
=
1{τ>t}
Q[τ > t | Ft]
E
[∫T
t
(λIuZ
I
u + λ
C
uZ
C
u)Q[τ > u | Fu]du | Ft
]
.
Proof. We begin by noting that since conditional expectation is a linear operator we
may reduce to prove the equation
E
[
1{t<τ=τX6T}Z
X
τ |Gt]
=
1{τ>t}
Q[τ > t | Ft]
E
[∫T
t
λXuZ
X
uQ[τ > u | Fu]du | Ft
]
,
for a generic X ∈ {I,C}. Then we can suppose that ZXu is a simple process, i.e. of
the form ZXu =
∑
i Zi1{ti<u6ti+1} where t = t1 < · · · < tN = T is a finite sequence of
points in [t, T ] and Zi is a Fti-measurable random variable. We can further simplify
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the process ZXu using again the linearity of the conditional expectation, so it enough
to prove the statement for processes of the type ZXu = Zs1{s<u6v} for t 6 s 6 v 6 T ,
where Zs is an Fs-measurable (and thus also Gs-measurable) random variable. We
start writing 1{s<τ=τX6v} as
1{s<τ=τX6v} = 1{v∧τ>τX} − 1{s∧τ>τX}
=
(
1{v∧τ>τX} −
∫v∧τ
0
λXudu
)
−
(
1{s∧τ>τX} −
∫s∧τ
0
λXudu
)
+
∫v∧τ
s∧τ
λXudu.
We can show that 1{v∧τ>τX} −
∫v∧τ
0 λ
X
udu is a G-martingale, in fact Mv = 1{v>τX} −∫v∧τX
0 λ
X
udu is a G-martingale because of formula 1.3.1 applied to the stopping time τX.
Then for the stopped process Mv∧τ we have Mv∧τ = 1{v∧τ>τX} −
∫v∧τ
0 λ
X
udu because
(v ∧ τX) ∧ τ = v ∧ τ. Hence 1{v∧τ>τX} −
∫v∧τ
0 λ
X
udu is also a martingale because it
coincides with a stopped martingale (see for example Revuz and Yor [1999]). Since
1{t<τ=τX6T}1{s<u6v} = 1{s<τ=τX6v} we have
E
[
1{t<τ=τX6T}Z
X
τ |Gt
]
= E
[(
Mv∧τ −Ms∧τ +
∫v∧τ
s∧τ
λXudu
)
Zs |Gt
]
= E
[
ZsE
[(
Mv∧τ −Ms∧τ +
∫v∧τ
s∧τ
λXudu
)
| Gs
]
|Gt
]
= E
[
ZsE
[∫v∧τ
s∧τ
λXudu | Gs
]
|Gt
]
= E
[
E
[∫v∧τ
s∧τ
Zsλ
X
udu | Gs
]
|Gt
]
= E
[∫T∧τ
t∧τ
ZXuλ
X
udu |Gt
]
=
1{τ>t}
Q[τ > t | Ft]
E
[∫T
t
λXuZ
X
uQ[τ > u | Fu]du | Ft
]
.
The last equality derives from Theorem 1.1.9 by noting that λXu is predictable (for more
details see Bielecki et al. [2009] section 3.8).
We now illustrate some possible choices to define a default time that follows a
reduced form model.
1.3.3 Poisson processes
One of the simplest choice one can make is using as jump generator a Poisson process:
Definition 1.3.5. Given a probability space (Ω,A ,Q) and a constant λ ∈ (0,∞) we say
that Nt is a Poisson process of intensity λ if:
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1. Q[N0 = 0] = 1;
2. the process Nt has independent stationary increments;
3. for 0 6 s < t the stochastic variable Nt−Ns is Poisson distributed with parameter
λ(t− s), i.e Q[Nt −Ns = k] =
(t−s)kλke−(t−s)λ
k! .
Remark 1.3.6. It is clear from the definition that a Poisson process can only assume
integer non-negative values. Moreover we can see that its defining properties are similar
to the ones of a Wiener process. It should be noted that they are indeed both particular
cases of a broader class of processes with independent stationary increments, known as
Lévy processes.
When defining τ as the first jump time of a Poisson process, we mean that
τ = inf{t > 0 | Nt = 1}
This is indeed the first jump of the process because we can show that the Poisson
process has unit jumps. In fact using Bayes’theorem we obtain:
Q[Nt −Nt−h = 1 | Nt −Nt−h > 1] =
hλe−hλ
1 − e−hλ
.
Hence taking the limit for h→ 0 we obtain that the probability of having a unit jump in
t, given the fact that the process has jumped in t equals 1. Since the Poisson process has
unit jumps, we have that Q[τ < t] = 1 −Q[Nt = 0] = 1 − e−λt. Hence the default time
has an exponential law with characteristic parameter λ. It is useful to give the following
interpretation for λ. Following Brigo et al. [2013b], we consider t, s such that t − s is
small, the probability Q[s < τ 6 t] = e−λs − e−λt ≈ λ(t − s). Hence λ can be viewed
as the default probability density with respect to time and is called default intensity.
Moreover the fact that Q[τ > t] = e−λt, gives survival probabilities the same structure
of discount factors in interest rate models. This is of course appealing since we can try
to use the interest rate machinery in dealing with default modeling. It is indeed in this
spirit that in the next sections we will introduce default times with time-varying and
possibly stochastic intensity.
1.3.4 Inhomogeneous Poisson processes
The main idea behind inhomogeneous Poisson process is to choose a time-varying,
deterministic, piece-wise continuous, non-negative function λt as the intensity of a
Poisson process.
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Definition 1.3.7. We say that a stochastic process Mt is a inhomogeneous Poisson process
with intensity λt if Mt has independent increments such that
Q[Mt −Ms = k] = (Λ(t) −Λ(s))
k e
−(Λ(t)−Λ(s))
k!
,
where
Λ(t) =
∫t
0
λsds.
Remark 1.3.8. We note that if λt is constant, Definition 1.3.7 becomes the usual definition
of a Poisson process. Moreover it can be shown, as in Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002],
that an inhomogeneous Poisson process with intensity λt can be constructed defining
Mt = NΛ(t) where Nt is a Poisson process with intensity one.
In the context of inhomogeneous Poisson processes we can define τ as
τ = inf{t |Mt = 1}.
This is the first jump time for Mt. Since Mt = 1 implies NΛ(t) = 1 and we know that
the first jump for Nt has an exponential law, we have that:
τ = Λ−1(ξ),
where ξ is an exponential random variable with parameter one. Again we can obtain
an expression for the cumulative distribution of τ, i.e. we have
Q[τ < t] = Q[Λ(τ) < Λ(t)] = Q[ξ < Λ(t)] = 1 − e−Λ(t).
As in the case of simple Poisson process we have that the default probability structure
is analogous to a discount factor structure for a deterministic short interest rate. In
the following section we further generalize our model, allowing us to have a stochastic
intensity.
1.3.5 Cox process
To define Cox processes we endow our probability space (Ω,A ,Q) with a filtration
F = (Fu)06u. Moreover we denote F∞ = σ(∪uFu) the sigma-field that contains all
the information retained in the filtration F. We take as λt a positive, F-progressively
measurable stochastic process. As we did before we define the cumulated intensity
Λ(t) =
∫t
0
λs(ω)ds,
where we wrote explicitly the dependence of λ from ω ∈ Ω.
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Definition 1.3.9. We say that a stochastic process Mt is a Cox process with intensity λt
if Mt conditioned on λ’s trajectories is a Poisson inhomogeneous process, i.e.
Q[Mt −Ms = k | F∞] = (Λ(t) −Λ(s))k e−(Λ(t)−Λ(s))
k!
We define τ as the first time the process Mt equals one, and also in this case we
find an explicit formula for the cumulative distribution of τ, i.e. for t 6 s
Q[τ < t | Fs] = E
[
1{τ<t} | Fs
]
= E
[
E
[
1{τ<t} | F∞] | Fs]
= E [1 −Q [Mt = 0 | F∞] | Fs] = 1 − e−Λ(t). (1.3.2)
Te last equality is due to the fact that Λt isFs-measurable. We note that Q[τ < t |Ft] =
Q[τ < t | F∞]. We can construct a Cox process Mt by means of a Poisson process.
What we do is to define Mt = NΛ(t) where Nt is a Poisson process with intensity one,
independent from the filtration F.
Hence also in the case of Cox processes we have that the survival probability term
structure is analogous to interest rate term structure in the case of stochastic short rate.
Remark 1.3.10. It is possible to show (see Appendices of Brigo and Mercurio [2007]) that
τ = Λ−1(ξ),
where ξ is a standard exponential random variable. It’s worth mentioning that Cox
processes are also called doubly stochastic Poisson processes because not only their
jumps are driven by random exponential variables but also because the jump intensity
itself is stochastic.
Remark 1.3.11. Usually the dynamic of λt is given by a stochastic differential equation,
and thanks to the above remark one can try to use dynamics analogue to the ones used
in interest rate modeling.
An important remark is stated in the following theorem (see Jeanblanc et al. [2009]
chapter 7).
Theorem 1.3.12. Consider a Cox process with cumulated intensity Λt =
∫t
0 λudu and the
indicator function Ht = 1{τ6t} where τ is the first jump of the just mentioned Cox process.
Then we have that the process
Ht −Λt∧τ
is a G-martingale.
Proof. From formula 1.1.1 we have, for s > t
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E[Hs −Ht | Gt] = E[1{t<τ6s} | Gt] =
1{τ>t}
Q[τ > t | Ft]
Q[t < τ 6 s | Ft]
= 1{τ>t}(1 − e
ΛtE[e−Λs | Ft]).
On the other hand, using Lemma 1.1.8 we obtain
E[Λs∧τ −Λt∧τ | Gt] = E
[
1{τ>t}(Λs∧τ −Λt) | Gt
]
=
1{τ>t}
Q[τ > t|Ft]
E
[∫∞
t
(Λs∧u −Λt)dQ[τ > u|Fu]du | Ft
]
= 1{τ>t}e
ΛtE
[∫∞
t
(Λs∧u −Λt)λue
−Λudu | Ft
]
= 1{τ>t}e
ΛtE
[∫s
t
(Λu −Λt)λue
−Λudu+ (Λs −Λt)
∫∞
s
λue
−Λudu | Ft
]
= 1{τ>t}e
ΛtE
[∫s
t
Λuλue
−Λudu−Λt
∫∞
t
λue
−Λudu+Λse
−Λs | Ft
]
= 1{τ>t}e
ΛtE
[∫s
t
Λuλue
−Λudu−Λte
−Λt +Λse
−Λs | Ft
]
= 1{τ>t}e
ΛtE
[
e−Λt − e−Λs | Ft
]
.
The last equality derives from solving by parts the integral
∫s
t Λuλue
−Λudu. So finally
we have
E[Hs −Ht | Gt] = E[Λs∧τ −Λt∧τ | Gt].
And this concludes the proof.
1.3.6 Multi-name Cox process model
In this section we give an idea on how to deal with the possible dependence of multiple
defaults times. We consider two entities I and C involved in some type of contract.
Moreover we introduce τI, τC two default times generated as first jump of two Cox
processes with F-adapted intensities λI, λC. We explicitly exclude the possibility of a
perfectly simultaneous default, namely Q[τI = τC] = 0. Now we have a broad choice
for the degree of dependence that we want our default times to have. As an example
one may suppose that these times are independent because the entities involved in the
contract belong to completely different categories. On the other hand it can happen
that we want these default times to be very correlated.
There are mainly two ways of introducing dependence among default times (Brigo
and Mercurio [2007]):
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• the first is to introduce dependence in the dynamics of λI and λc. Suppose for
example that:
dλI(t) = µI(t, λI(t))dt+ σI(t, λI(t))dWI(t),
dλC(t) = µC(t, λC(t))dt+ σC(t, λC(t))dWC(t).
then we can introduce dependence in the diffusion by imposing
dWIdWC = ρI,Cdt
and leaving ξI, ξC (the variables defined in Remark 1.3.10) independent. This
will be the approach we are going to use in the following chapters because of its
simplicity. On the other hand one of the biggest disadvantages is that this type
of dependence isn’t always able to produce an high degree of correlation among
default events (Jouanin et al. [2001]).
• the second consists in introducing dependence among ξI and ξC. This is usually
done by copula functions which are a way to describe the dependence in a
multivariate distribution. The previous statement can be made precise (Sklar’s
Theorem) but a treatment of copulas is outside the scope of this thesis and we
remand to further readings on the topic ( a brief introduction can be found in
Brigo and Mercurio [2007], while a standard reference is Nelsen [1999]).
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CHAPTER 2
Pricing a contract
In this chapter we describe a model for the market and we use it to compute the price
of contracts between two defaultable parties.
2.1 Arbitrage-free Pricing
Since we want some uncertainty in our model, we will use a probability space Ω with a
σ-algebra A , on which are defined a probability measure P (called objective probability)
and a filtration F. The filtration F = (Ft)t>0 is used to describe information flow at
different times and we want it to satisfy the usual conditions of right continuity and
completeness, furthermore we suppose that F0 is the trivial filtration {∅,Ω}. We now
aim to introduce financial products in our model using some stochastic variables, in
order to make it possible we suppose that in our market there are k+ 1 continuously
traded, non dividend paying, primary securities.
Definition 2.1.1. The price process St = (S0t, · · · ,Sk−1t ) of the securities traded in the
market is a Rk-valued semi-martingale (with respect to the filtration F and to P), i.e.
each component Sit = M
i
t + A
i
t where M
i
t is a local martingale, and A
i
t is a càdlàg
adapted process with locally bounded variation. We assume that the market is liquid,
meaning that if someone is selling there’s always someone willing to buy and vice
versa.
Moreover we assume that S0t is a risk-free bank account, in the sense that its dynamic
is given by: {
dS0t = rtS
0
tdt
S0t = 1
where rt is an adapted process called short term interest rate. This name is due to the
intuition that the growth rate of the process S0t in a short amount of time dt is equal to
rt. We will use the notation Bt := S0t.
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Remark 2.1.2. We note that S0t = exp(
∫t
0 rudu), and thus it is indeed a continuous
semi-martingale. We denote the discount factor
D(s, t, r) := e−
∫t
s rudu,
which corresponds to the amount of money that is needed at time t to obtain 1$ at time
s investing in the risk-free bank account, thus the name discount factor reflects the fact
that multiplying an amount of money at time t by D(s, t, r) we are discounting it back
to its value at time s.
Remark 2.1.3. We remark that to develop arbitrage theory is not necessary to suppose a
particular dynamic for S0 but only that S0 follows a strictly positive semi-martingale
(for a discussion see Musiela and Rutkowski [2005]).
A fundamental concept in mathematical finance is the idea of arbitrage. We now give
an informal definition of arbitrage, and refer the reader to Delbaen and Schachermayer
[2006] for a more precise one.
Definition 2.1.4. An arbitrage is a strategy that makes a profit in a financial market
without risk and without net investment of capital (Delbaen and Schachermayer [2004]).
A typical example of arbitrage is when the same stock is traded at two different prices.
In this case a trader can buy the cheapest stock and at the same time selling the most
expensive one realizing a sure positive profit.
Assumption 2.1.5 (Principle of No Arbitrage). In our model we assume that there is no
possibility of arbitrage.
The idea behind this assumption is that in the real market if there is a possibility to
gain some money without risking anything, everyone will move in that direction and
this will soon close the arbitrage opportunity.
Example 2.1.6. Suppose that the prices of the same stock are different in two exchanges,
for example London and Frankfurt. Then what will happen is that everybody will be
buying the stock where is cheaper and selling it where is more expensive to realize
a sure gain. Doing this the price of the cheaper stock will rise due to the presence
of a great demand while the price of the more expensive stock will diminish because
everyone is selling it and no one is buying. Thus the two prices will approximately
become the same, thus making the trade not profitable.
The absence of arbitrage has some interesting consequences. In fact it can be proved
to be essentially equivalent to the existence of a probability Q (called risk-neutral
probability or martingale measure), equivalent to P such that the discounted price of
any security in the market (D(0, t, r)St) is a martingale. This result is usually called
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First Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, and has many variants that differ for example
in the regularity assumptions they make on the price process of the traded securities
and on whether they consider a continuous time interval or a discrete set of times.
More details can be found in Delbaen and Schachermayer [2006] and reference therein.
We now aim to price some products in our market, in doing this we adapt from Bielecki
et al. [2006] chapter 4.
We introduce a new product with maturity T in our market and we suppose that it
pays dividends according to a process of finite variation At defined on [0, T ] such that
A0 = 0. We denote with Sk the yet to be found price of our new product. Note that we
do not suppose that Skt follows a semi-martingale. To model the trading happening in
our market we give the following definition
Definition 2.1.7. We say that a trading strategy in our market is a predictable Rk+1
valued process ϕt = (ϕ0t, . . . ,ϕ
k
t ) where ϕ
i
t represents the number of i-th asset held
at time t. If ϕit < 0 that means that we are selling the i-th asset. Note that we assume
that is possible to sell an asset without owning it (short-selling) and that the market is
friction-less, i.e. there are no transaction costs.
To price our product we suppose to buying it at time 0 and to invest all the dividends
that it originates in the bank account. This strategy, called buy and hold is represented
by the strategy ϕt = (ϕ0t, 0 . . . 0, 1).
Definition 2.1.8. We say that a strategy ϕ is self-financing if the associated wealth process
U(ϕ) =
∑k
i=0ϕ
i
tS
i
t satisfies:
Ut(ϕ) −U0(ϕ) =
∫
]0,t]
ϕkdAu +
k∑
i=0
∫
]0,t]
ϕitdS
i
t.
We note that the wealth of a self financing strategy is thus equal to the initial wealth
plus the gains derived from the change in value and the dividends of the assets that
compose the strategy. Thus is self financing in the sense that there is no withdrawal or
immission of cash.
We suppose to choose ϕ0t in such a way that the buy and hold strategy is self
financing ( see Jeanblanc et al. [2009] chapter 2 for details). Thus we have
Ut(ϕ) −U0(ϕ) = At + S
k
t − S
k
0 +
∫
]0,t]
ϕ0tdS
0
t.
The following is borrowed from Bielecki et al. [2006], and is needed to prove the next
theorem.
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Lemma 2.1.9. The discounted wealth U∗t = D(0, t, r)Ut(ϕ) of the buy and hold strategy
follows
U∗t −U
∗
0 = D(0, t, r)S
k
t − S
k
0 +
∫
]0,t]
D(0,u, r)dAu.
Proof. We define (omitting the symbol ϕ) Ut = Ut − Skt = ϕ0tS
0
t and thus we have for
the self financing condition,
Ut −U0 = At +
∫
]0,t]
ϕ0tdS
0
t
and so the process Ut follows a semi-martingale. Then an application of the Ito product
rule and the self financing condition leads to
d(D(0, t, r)Ut) =dD(0, t, r)Ut +D(0, t, r)dUt
= dD(0, t, r)ϕ0tS
0
t +D(0, t, r)dAt +D(0, t, r)ϕ
0
tdS
0
t.
= D(0, t, r)dAt.
To obtain the last equation we used that D(0, t, r)−1 = S0t and that 0 = d(1) =
d(D(0, t, r)S0t) = dD(0, t, r)S
0
t + dS
0
tD(0, t, r). So we have obtained
D(0, t, r)(Ut − Skt ) = (U0 − S
k
0 ) +
∫
]0,t]
D(0,u, r)dAu,
and hence the thesis.
Now, we suppose that our market model is arbitrage free, and in particular that
there exists a martingale measure Q for it. We know that the discounted prices of
non dividend paying traded securities follow martingales under this assumption. It
is known (see chapter 8 in Musiela and Rutkowski [2005]) that the discounted wealth
process of a self financing trading strategy follows a local martingale under Q. We
restrict ourselves to admissible trading strategies, i.e. trading strategies such that their
discounted wealth process follows a true Q-martingale. Since we want our market
model to be arbitrage free, seems quite natural to postulate that the buy and hold
strategy involving the asset Skt is admissible. We are ready to price our product, in fact
we have
Theorem 2.1.10. The price Skt follows
Skt = E
Q
[
D(t, T , r)SkT +
∫
]t,T ]
D(t,u, r)dAu | Ft
]
. (2.1.1)
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Proof. The assumed martingale property for U∗t reads
EQ[U∗T −U
∗
t | Ft] = 0,
then using the Lemma 2.1.9 we obtain
EQ
[
D(0, T , r)SkT −D(0, t, r)S
k
t +
∫
]t,T ]
D(0,u, r)dAu | Ft
]
= 0.
The last expression is equivalent to the thesis since D(0, t, r)Skt is Ft-measurable.
Remark 2.1.11. Note that there could be many martingale measures for a given market,
i.e. Q is in general not unique. Then we can choose many different prices for the new
product at time t such that the market M ′ is still arbitrage free. What will happen
is that the market will choose one of those prices based on supply and demand for
the particular claim. Furthermore there is one case in which the price process of Sk
is uniquely determined, i.e. when the measure Q is unique. The Second Fundamental
Theorem of Asset Pricing states that the probability Q is uniquely determined if and
only if each contingent claim can be replicated by means of the original market assets
S0t, · · · ,Sk−1t . With replicating a product, we mean that one can build a self financing
strategy by buying and selling assets S0t, · · · ,Sk−1t in such a way that at a time t his
portfolio will have a wealth process equal to the wealth of the buy and hold strategy
for the new product. Another useful result is that if the product we are considering
can be replicated then its price is uniquely determined and thus for that kind of claims
equation 2.1.1 gives a unique price independently of how many martingale measure do
exist (see for example Björk [2004] chapter 10).
2.2 Pricing Defaultable Claims
We want to investigate how to price a defaultable contract, i.e. a contract in which at
least one of the parties involved can default. In our discussion we mainly follow Crépey
et al. [2014]. We start by considering a complete probability space (Ω,A ,Q). We endow
our probability space with a filtration F = (Ft)t>0. This filtration represents all the
default free information, i.e. the information on contracts, rates or processes not affected
by default. We take in consideration a generic contract between two counterparties, the
investor I and the counterparty C. We take the investor’s perspective when evaluating
a deal. We model the default times of C and I as two non negative random variables,
respectively τC and τI. These stopping times are supposed to satisfy the hypothesis
made in section 1.1.1. We define the first to default time τ = τC ∧ τI. As we did before
we define the processes HCt = 1{τC>t} and H
I
t = 1{τI>t}, and respectively the filtrations
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HC = σ(HC),HI = σ(HI). We put together all the available information at a certain
time t defining the filtration G = (Gt)t>0, where Gt = Ft ∨H Ct ∨H
I
t . We assume
that all the filtrations introduced satisfy the usual conditions of completeness and right
continuity. All the processes that we consider are càdlàg, G-adapted and are assumed to
satisfy suitable integrability conditions needed to evaluate the functionals introduced
later on. We indicate with Et[] the conditional expectation with respect to Gt. As we
did before we work under the Hypothesis 1.3.1, and we suppose that Q is a martingale
probability equivalent to the real world probability. This means that we suppose that
the discounted price of non dividend paying traded securities follow G-martingales.
Our main tool in this analysis is the cash-flow decomposition. We rewrite the payoff of
a defaultable contract as a sum of cash-flows that have a clear financial meaning and
then use the pricing techniques illustrated in the previous section to obtain the value of
the contract.
Definition 2.2.1. A defaultable contract between two parties consist of
• a maturity T , i.e. the time at which the contracts cease to exist (from now on the
letter T will always indicate the maturity of the contract we are considering). We
indicate τ = τ∧ T ;
• a promised cash-flow process pit. Such process is assumed of finite variation and
we call Π(s, t) =
∫t
sD(s,u, r)dpiu the cumulated discounted cash-flows between
in the interval [s, t]. The promised cash-flow process represents the amount of
money that the contract generates if none of the counterparties defaults. We
indicate ∆t the process defined by ∆t = pit − pit− that represents the jumps in the
promised cash-flows;
• an effective cash-flow process defined by dpit = 1{τ>t}dpit. This process is analogous
to pit but takes into account the fact that after τ there will be no more promised
cash-flows. We define Π(s, t) =
∫t
sD(s,u, r)dpiu;
• a closeout cash-flow θτ, computed following the rules outlined in the ISDA Master
Agreement, that is a Gτ-measurable random variable that represents the fact that
at τ the closeout amount Qτ is computed and if positive to the non defaulted party,
a fraction of it will be due to the surviving counterparty. On the other hand if the
value is positive to the defaulted party, the surviving party will have to pay the
whole sum.
Suppose that we are in a default-free world, then we can compute the price of a
contract at time t as Vt = Et[Π(t, T)]. If instead we consider the possibility of defaults
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we obtain, for t ∈ [0, τ] that the default inclusive price Vt satisfies
Vt = Et[Π(t, τ) +D(t, τ, r)1{τ<T}θτ]. (2.2.1)
This equation is justified by the reasoning of the previous section, where we use as
dividend process At = pit + 1{τ<T}θτ. Note that due to the presence of τ which in
general is not an F stopping time, we have to use the G filtration instead of the F
filtration in our reasoning.
2.2.1 Counterparty Valuation Adjustment
Suppose that only the counterparty C can default, and instead the investor is default-
free. This means that τ = τC and we can assume τI =∞ or τI > T almost surely. We
write an explicit formula for the computation of the closeout cash-flows. We name
X = Qτ + ∆τ the algebraic debt of the counterparty to the investor at first-to-default
time τ. We observe that then θτ must satisfy
θτ = (RCX
+ − X−), (2.2.2)
where RC is a GτC measurable random variable such that RC 6 1. In fact:
• if the value of the contract at τ is positive to the non defaulted party (the investor)
then it is recovered partially;
• on the other hand if the value is negative to the investor, then the investor will
have to pay the whole sum to the counterparty’s liquidators.
We now can define a process that represents the difference of value between a
defaultable contract and a non defaultable one.
Definition 2.2.2. The cumulative Total Valuation Adjustment process, Θt, is given by
Θt = Et
[∫T
o
D(t,u, r)dpiu
]
− Et
[∫τ
o
D(t,u, r)dpiu +D(t, τ, r)1{τ<T}θτ
]
This formula means that Θ is the conditional expectation of the difference of the
cumulated cash-flows generated by the contract seen as default free and the total
cash-flows of the defaultable contract.
Remark 2.2.3. Regarding the Total Valuation Adjustment, we are following the nomen-
clature used in Crépey et al. [2014].
Lemma 2.2.4. For t ∈ [0, τ] we have that
Θt = Vt − Vt + 1{τ=t<T}∆τ (2.2.3)
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Proof. To prove the statement is sufficient to prove that∫t
0
D(t, s, r)dpis −
∫t
0
D(t, s, r)dpis = 1{τ=t<T}∆τ.
The previous equation can also be written as∫t
0
D(t, s, r)dpis −
∫t
0
D(t, s, r)1{τ>s}dpis = 1{τ=t<T}∆τ. (2.2.4)
To prove equation 2.2.4 we have to analyze three cases:
1. τ 6= t, or equivalently t < τ, since t ∈ [0, τ]. In this case both the sides of equation
2.2.4 are equal to zero because 1{τ>s} = 1;
2. τ > T . Also in this case both sides of equation 2.2.4 are equal to zero because
s 6 T .
3. τ = t < T . In this case on the right hand side we have ∆τ = piτ − piτ− which
coincides with the left hand side
∫
[0,τ]D(t, s, r)dpis−
∫
[0,τ)D(t, s, r)dpis. hand side
So we have that the price Vt for t < τ can be written as
Vt = Vt −Θt (2.2.5)
To give a more meaningful expression for Θ we need the following
Theorem 2.2.5. For t ∈ [0, τ] we have
Θt = Et[D(t, τ, r)1{τ<T}(Vτ + ∆τ − θτ)]
Proof. We start by noting that D(0, t, r)Θt is a G-martingale. This follows by the
definition of Θ and by the tower rule of conditional expectations. In fact we have for
s < t
Es[D(0, t, r)Θt] = Es
[
D(0, t, r)Et
[∫T
o
D(t,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
o
D(t,u, r)dpiu +D(t, τ, r)1{τ<T}θτ
]]
= Es
[
D(0, t, r)
(∫T
o
D(t,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
o
D(t,u, r)dpiu +D(t, τ, r)1{τ<T}θτ
)]
= Es
[
D(0, s, r)
(∫T
o
D(s,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
o
D(s,u, r)dpiu +D(s, τ, r)1{τ<T}θτ
)]
= D(0, s, r)Θs.
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So we can use the martingale property and we have that
D(0, t, r)Θt = Et[D(0, τ, r)Θτ] = Et[D(0, τ, r)(Vτ − Vτ + 1{τ=τ<T}∆τ)]
= Et[D(0, τ, r)1{τ<T}(Vτ − θτ + ∆τ)].
The last equation follows from the definition of Vt and the fact that if τ > T then
Vτ = Vτ.
By the definition of X and θτ we have that
Θt = Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(Vτ −Qτ + X− (RCX
+ − X−)]
= Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(Vτ −Qτ)] + Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(X− (RCX
+ − X−))]
= Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(Vτ −Qτ)] + Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(1 − RC)X
+].
Definition 2.2.6. The last term in the previous equation is called Counterparty Valuation
Adjustment or more simply CVA. If we note LGDC = 1 − RC we can write
CVA = Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)LGDCX
+]. (2.2.6)
The term Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(Vτ −Qτ)] is called replacement cost (RC) and represents the
possible mismatch between the price of the default-free contract at τ and the valuation
of the contract obtained following the ISDA Master Agreement rules.
Remark 2.2.7. To better understand the meaning of CVA, suppose that Qτ = Vτ. Then
we have the following expression for the price of the contract Vt
Vt = Vt︸︷︷︸
Value of
the contract
if supposed
risk-free
−Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)LGDCX
+]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA
.
It is clear then that CVA is a positive amount that must be subtracted from the risk-free
price of the contract to obtain the price of the defaultable deal. This makes sense
because in our perspective if we (default free investor) are buying a contract from a
defaultable entity we want to pay less than the risk-free price Vt. It must be noted that
sometimes in literature CVA is presented as a negative value that must be added to the
risk-free price. Of course this corresponds in considering the minus sign as part of the
CVA.
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2.2.2 Debt Valuation Adjustment
We want to compute the Total valuation adjustment in a slightly more general case.
Suppose that now both the investor and the counterparty can default. The first
difference with the previous section is the definition of the closeout cash-flows, in fact
we have to take into account who is the first counterparty to default while until now
we supposed that one of the parties was default-free. Again we define X = Qτ + ∆τ,
but this time θτ will be defined as
θτ = 1{τ=τC}(RCX
+ − X−) − 1{τ=τI}(RIX
− − X+). (2.2.7)
To understand why this formula makes sense is useful to remind that we use the
investor’s perspective, hence the minus in front of the second term, in fact:
• if the counterparty defaults before the investor, we have an expression for θτ that
is identical to the one of the previous section;
• if instead the investor defaults before the counterparty, then if the value of the
contract was negative to the investor itself, only a fraction of its value would be
payed to the counterparty. Instead if the contract was positive to the investor the
counterparty would have to pay the investor the whole sum.
Also in the case that both the counterparties are subject to default we can define the
cumulative Total Valuation Adjustment. And further Theorem 2.2.5 holds true. The
real difference now comes when we compute an explicit expression for Θt. In fact we
have by definition of X and θτ
Θt = Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(Vτ −Qτ + X− 1{τ=τC}(RCX
+ − X−) + 1{τ=τI}(RIX
− − X+))]
= Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(Vτ −Qτ)] + Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τC}D(t, τ, r)(X− (RCX
+ − X−))]
− Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τI}D(t, τ, r)(X− (RIX
− − X+))]
= Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(Vτ −Qτ)] + Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τC}D(t, τ, r)(1 − RC)X
+]
− Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τI}D(t, τ, r)(1 − RI)X
−].
Definition 2.2.8. The first two terms of the previous equation are again the RC and
CVA terms, while the last one, −Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τI}D(t, τ, r)(1 − RI)X
−], is called Debt
Valuation Adjustment or simply DVA.
28
Chapter 2. Pricing a contract
Remark 2.2.9. If we suppose Qτ = Vτ we have
Vt = Vt︸︷︷︸
Value of
the contract
if supposed
risk-free
−Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τC}D(t, τ, r)(1 − RC)X
+]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA
−(−Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τI}D(t, τ, r)(1 − RI)X
−])︸ ︷︷ ︸
DVA
.
So we have that the price is made up of a risk-free part, a CVA adjustment and a DVA
one. We remark that following our definition DVA is a negative quantity that must be
subtracted from the risk-free price increasing the price of the contract. In fact the DVA
term accounts for our credit worthiness, i.e. our counterparty will want a premium to
conclude a deal with us rather than with a risk-free party. We further observe that CVA
and DVA are symmetric quantities, in the sense that what a party sees at CVA is seen
as DVA by the counterparty and vice versa (Brigo et al. [2013b], chapters 10 and 12).
Remark 2.2.10. In the literature the part of TVA constituted by CVA and DVA together
is called Bilateral Valuation Adjustment (BVA) in Brigo et al. [2013b].
Differently from CVA, the inclusion of DVA term when pricing a contract is still
under debate, in fact DVA has some particular features that make it a complicated
object. Suppose that we entered a deal and then at a later time our credit quality
worsens, i.e. our default probability increases. This will make more probable the
event τ = τI, hence increasing in absolute value the DVA term. This growth will
increase the value of the contract so that we realize a profit. Moreover this simple
example is not so artificial, in fact in 2009 Citigroup reported a positive mark-to-market
due to its worsened credit quality, and in 2011 the same happened for banks like J.P.
Morgan and Bank of America (see Citigroup [2009], pag. 110 and WallStreetJournal
[2009] for more details). This is counter-intuitive and leads to criticism through DVA
inclusion when pricing a deal. Moreover making profits through the decreasing of
the creditworthiness can lead to dangerous situations and then DVA is not taken
into account while calculating minimum capital requirements following the Basel III
guidelines (Brigo et al. [2013b] chapter 10). On the other hand DVA should be included
in the balance sheets, as suggested in the Financial Accounting Standard. Further, as
we saw before what a party calls DVA is CVA for the counterparty and this has the
important feature of making the price symmetric.
Remark 2.2.11. We notice that both CVA and DVA add a sort of optionality to the payoff
of the contract. In fact both these adjustment terms are analogous to a payoff of a call
option on the value of the contract with random maturity τ.
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2.3 Collateralized Contracts
Suppose that two defaultable parties want to enter a deal and they want to alleviate
the counterparty risk embedded in the contract. One of the countermeasures they
can take is using a collateral margining procedure. In this section we use a particular
collateral procedure to simplify the computations and to give a simpler intuition of
what a collateral procedure is. A deeper analysis of the different choices available for
collateralization will be analyzed in the following chapter.
2.3.1 Collateral Account
The collateral mechanism works roughly as follows:
• the two parties agree to calculate the value of the contract at certain dates (margin-
ing dates) t1, · · · , ti, · · · , tn comprised between the inception of the deal and its
maturity. The time between two of these dates is called margining period;
• at each date ti they calculate the value of the contract Valuei;
• the party to which the change in value ∆Valuei = Valuei−Valuei−1 is negative
(named collateral giver) has to pay its counterparty (collateral taker) the sum
|∆Valuei|.
We now examine an example that illustrates briefly the collateral procedure and
how it reduces counterparty risk exposure.
Example 2.3.1. Suppose that ALICE Bank signs a contract with BOB Bank with 0$ value
at inception (for example a swap) and they agree to use a collateral procedure and
they fix daily margining dates ti. Suppose that at time t1 the value of the contract for
ALICE Bank is 110$. Hence BOB Bank has to pay 110$ to ALICE Bank because from
its perspective the deal is be worth −110$. At time t2 the value of the contract from
ALICE Bank’s perspective is 90$. Because of that ALICE Bank has to give BOB Bank
the change in value of the deal from time t1, i.e. 20$. Suppose now that just after time
t2 BOB bank fails. Further assume that the value of the contract didn’t change too
much between the default time τ and t2. Let’s say that the deal is now worth 100$ from
ALICE Bank perspective. It’s easy to see that ALICE Bank thanks to collateralization
already has 90$ out of 100$ of the value of the contract (just the sum of the amounts
posted as collateral). If the deal was not collateralized and supposing a recovery rate of
40%, ALICE Bank would have recovered only 40$ out of 100$.
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Remark 2.3.2. We can see the collateral account as the netting of two separate account,
one for each party, in which the investor and the counterparty post money as the
contract’s value moves against them.
2.3.2 Inclusion of Collateral into Pricing Formulas
To model collateral margining procedure we introduce the collateral process Γt. This
process represents the amount of collateral held from the investor at time t. A positive
Γt means that the counterparty is posting money to the investor while a negative Γt
represents the fact that the investor is passing money to the counterparty. The money
represented by Γt is supposed to be remunerated at the risk free rate. We now have to
redefine some quantities already defined in the previous sections to take into account
the presence of the process Γt. The algebraic debt of the counterparty to the investor at
first-to-default time τ now is defined as X = Qτ + ∆τ − Γτ since the investor already
has the amount of money Γτ at default. Also the closeout cash-flow has to be modified,
in fact we have
θτ = Γτ + 1{τ=τC}(RCX
+ − X−) − 1{τ=τI}(RIX
− − X+). (2.3.1)
This is because at default time the investor will have the amount of money Γτ derived
from the collateralization procedure.
Remark 2.3.3. We note that in the context of equation 2.3.1 we assume that collateral is
treated like any other cash-flow from the contract, in particular it has the same recovery
rate. In the following chapter we are going to analyze different margining possibilities.
The Total Valuation Adjustment, as in the previous sections, satisfies the equation
Θt = Et[D(t, τ, r)1{τ<T}(Vτ + ∆τ − θτ)].
Since both the expression for ∆τ and θτ contain the term Γ we have that Θt also in
the case of collateralization satisfies
Θt =Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(Vτ −Qτ)] + Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τC}D(t, τ, r)(1 − RC)X
+]
− Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τI}D(t, τ, r)(1 − RI)X
−].
What must be noted is that the term Γt appears in the previous formula as part of
the X terms.
What we obtained so far is the following formula to price a defaultable claim for
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t ∈ [0, τ]:
Vt =Vt − Et[1{τ<T}D(t, τ, r)(Vτ −Qτ)]
− Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τC}D(t, τ, r)LGDC(Qτ + ∆τ − Γτ)
+]
+ Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τI}D(t, τ, r)LGDI(Qτ + ∆τ − Γτ)
−]
.
(2.3.2)
2.3.3 A Useful Special Case
We now give a different formulation of the pricing equation for a defaultable claim that
can be used under some assumptions on the cash-flows of the contract we are dealing
with. Our purpose is to simplify equation (2.3.2) from a computational point of view.
In fact what we aim to do is removing the explicit dependence from τ and resorting to
take expectations with respect to the F filtration instead of the G one, thus avoiding τ
simulation and simplifying the process of calculating conditional expectations. While
the benefit obtained from not having to simulate τ is clear, the full benefit obtained by
switching pricing filtration will be completely clear after reading chapter 5.
Theorem 2.3.4. Suppose that we have the F-intensity rates λIt, λCt of the two default times τI, τC.
Moreover suppose that ∆τ = 0 and that the collateral process Γt, the CSA valuation process Qt
and the risk-free value process Vt are bounded F-predictable processes, then for t ∈ [0, τ]:
Vt =Vt −
1
Q[τ > t|Ft]
(
E
[∫T
t
D(t,u, r)(Vu −Qu)dQ[τ 6 u|Fu]|Ft
]
+ E
[∫T
t
λCuD(t,u, r)Q[τ > u|Fu]LGDC(Qu − Γu)
+du|Ft
]
−E
[∫T
t
λIuD(t,u, r)Q[τ > u|Fu]LGDI(Qu − Γu)
−du|Ft
])
.
(2.3.3)
Proof. To prove this result we have to apply Theorem 1.1.8 to the first line of equation
2.3.2 and Theorem1.3.4 to the other terms. We note that being t ∈ [0, τ] then 1{τ>t} ≡
1.
Remark 2.3.5. If we assume that the default times are generated by a Cox process and
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are conditionally independent we obtain
Vt =Vt − E
[∫T
t
(λCu + λ
I
u)D(t,u, r+ λ
I + λC)(Vu −Qu)du|Ft
]
− E
[∫T
t
λCuD(t,u, r+ λ
I + λC)LGDC(Qu − Γu)
+du|Ft
]
+ E
[∫T
t
λIuD(t,u, r+ λ
I + λC)LGDI(Qu − Γu)
−du|Ft
]
.
(2.3.4)
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Market practice
In this chapter we review some market practice regarding collateralization and close out.
Further we generalize the pricing formulas of the previous chapter to deal with more
realistic market procedures. We use the same notation of the previous chapter, and we
consider a defaultable contract between two parties, a investor I and an counterparty C.
3.1 OTC Derivatives
What we consider here is an OTC contract, i.e. a contract traded over the counter. This
means that this type of contract is not traded in a financial exchange but is a private
deal between two parties. Thus there is the need for these parties to agree, not only on
the more typical deal related aspects, such as price, notional, payments dates and so on
, but also on how to reduce the risk of the deal. For example they will have to agree on
collateral scheduling and netting agreement.
For derivatives usually the agreements are governed by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association, ISDA. This is a trade organization of entities involved in
over the counter derivatives, and has created a standard type of contract , the ISDA
Master Agreement to be used to trade derivatives in the over the counter market. The
Master Agreement defines the framework in which subsequent trades between two
counterparties will take place. In particular every transaction between the two parties
will follow the Master Agreement thus easing the netting process in case of default
of one of the parties. In this regard, the Master Agreement defines how the close-out
procedure is performed and what is a default event thus standardizing such aspects of
the transaction.
If the parties involved agree upon a collateralization scheme then a Credit Support
Annex, CSA in included in the contract. The CSA contains the specifications of the
collateral procedure, such as dates and collateral ownership rules, and it is subject to
the master agreement.
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3.2 Close Out Valuation
In this section we will examine three types of close-out valuation modeling, or more
precisely three possible choices for Qτ. The close-out amount Qτ is the price that can be
obtained by the non defaulted party, on the market, to replace the just defaulted deal. It
is clear that modeling the procedure of replacing a defaulted deal rises several possible
choices. A possible choice is the risk-free close-out modeling, namely at default the
net present value of the residual deal is computed taking the conditional expectation
of future payments as if the deal was risk-free. Another way to model close-out is to
assume that at default of the counterparty (say I) the remaining entity B will try to
replace the original deal with a new one with a “safe” institution. In this case the new
institution will charge an unilateral CVA to B (because the new institution is supposed
to have a very high credit quality). Another possibility is to assume that the new
counterparty has the same credit quality of the defaulted one that it should replace.
We consider both B and I to be defaultable. In the case of a risk-free closeout we
choose Qτ = Vτ since we are valuing the residual deal as risk-free. Thus we have that
the RC term in the Θt expression vanishes.
If instead, we want to model the closeout as if the new counterparty were risk-free,
we must change the Qτ term to reflect that the survived party (B) is still risky for the
new “risk free” counterparty. Thus it makes sense to choose Qτ = Vτ +UDVAτ where
UDVA, Unilateral Debt Value Adjustment, is the DVA the surviving party will face if
entering the same deal at τ with a default free counterparty.
A new counterparty with the same creditworthiness of the defaulted one can be
represented choosing Qτ = V (see Crépey et al. [2014] chapter 3).
The previous models reflect the ISDA(2009) Closeout Amount Protocol document
where it states
“In determining a Closeout Amount, the Determining Party may consider
any relevant information, including, without limitation, one or more of the
following types of information: (i) quotations (either firm or indicative) for
replacement transactions supplied by one or more third parties that may
take into account the creditworthiness of the Determining Party at the time
the quotation is provided[...]”.
Thus a deal can be evaluated upon default taking into account the creditworthiness
of the surviving party.
Remark 3.2.1. There are both advantages and disadvantages in the different choices for
closeout modeling. As an example risk-free close-out increases the risk of contagion
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due to the fact that debtors (and not only creditors) of a defaulted counterparty will
face losses. In fact at default the once risky deal is accounted as if it was risk-free and
it’s payment are to be made to the defaulted entity’s creditors. So debtors will face a
jump in the amount of money they need to refund. On the other hand accounting for
the credit risk of the survived party implies that liquidators of the defaulted company
will receive less money. Hence we see that the choice of the type of model to use is
crucial and should be carefully chosen depending on the type of contract.
3.3 Collateral Practice
In the previous chapter we introduced collateral as a way to reduce counterparty risk.
Now we describe some collateralization schemes used in the market.
3.3.1 Margin Account
Suppose that we have a margin account Mt that represents the amount of collateral
held from the investor at time t. This account plays the same role as Γt in section
2.3.2. We suppose further that both B and I can reinvest the money present in the
margin account (as we did in section 2.3.2). In this case we say that the margin account
can be rehypotecated. Of course, following our notation, B can invest the funds of the
margin account when she has it, i.e. when Mt > 0 and the same goes on for I, namely
she can re-invest Mt while Mt < 0. Since we allow for collateral rehypotecation we
must take into account the possibility of default also for the money posted as collateral.
We call R ′I and R
′
C the recovery rate associated with the margin account in the case
Mt > 0 or Mt < 0 respectively (to reflect which of the parties has the collateral). We
call LGD ′I = 1 − R
′
I and LGD
′
C = 1 − R
′
C.
Remark 3.3.1. We note that the recovery rates for the margin account can differ from the
recovery rates for the contract. In fact usually the surviving party has precedence on
other creditors to get back the collateral and thus it is possible to assume R ′I > RI and
R ′C > RC (Brigo et al. [2013b]).
3.3.2 Gap Risk and Initial Margin
Although margin account reduces counterparty risk, there are still some risks that can
arise on default due to some mismatch between the margin account and the contract’s
valuation (Brigo and Pallavicini [2014]). These risks contribute to what is called gap risk
(Brigo et al. [2014]) and we give examples of some of them:
37
3.3. Collateral Practice
• we can have a risk due to mismatch between the margin account and the value of
the contract just before the default, in the sense that the margining procedure is
not perfect and do not match exactly the value of the contract;
• we can have a risk because the contract’s value jumps at default, so diminishing
the impact of our margin account on default risk;
• we can have a risk due to the length of the default procedure. In fact there is a
delay of δ days, called cure period, between the default event τ and the closeout
cash-flows at time τ+ δ. Thus the change in value of the contract over this period
is not accounted for in the margin account.
To mitigate some of the risk just described, we see a diffusion of the so called initial
margin (for International Settlements and of Securities Commissions [2013]). Namely
we add two collateral accounts NIt,N
C
t that should be kept distinct from the margin
account Mt. NIt and N
C
t represent the amount of money that the investor and the
counterparty respectively should post into segregated accounts to cover the gap risk.
Remembering that we embody the investor’s perspective we have that NIt 6 0, since we
put money in the account that will be used by the counterparty in case of our default,
and NCt > 0 since we will benefit from this money in case the counterparty defaults.
We further suppose that these two accounts aren’t subject to default because are kept
segregated so that the amount of money that forms the initial margin accounts can’t be
rehypotecated.
Remark 3.3.2. Note that in this case, differently from the margin account that can be
viewed as a netting of two accounts, the two accounts are kept distinct.
We now focus on obtaining a representation of the price of a defaultable contract V
in presence of a cure period of δ days. We start observing that
Vt = Et
[∫τ
t
D(t,u)1{u<τ}dpiu +D(t, τ+ δ)θτ+δ
]
,
where θτ+δ is Gτ+δ-measurable, since the closeout amount is payed at τ + δ. In
the following we give an expression of θτ+δ that suits the collateral setting taking
into account initial margin accounts, collateral recovery rate and cure period. We
denote Qτ+δ the remaining contract valuation to emphasize the fact that such value is
effectively computed at τ+ δ. We examine the closeout cash-flows by cases following
Brigo and Pallavicini [2014] and supposing for the moment that the investor is the
surviving party, i.e. τ = τC. In the following discussion by cases we consider θτ+δ
to be of the form θτ+δ = Mτ +NIτ +NCτ + ητ+δ and we calculate ητ+δ. This means
that at closeout every party gets the ownership of the collateral that deserves and then
makes the calculations needed.
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1. We start supposing that the investor measures a positive value for the remaining
contract, and some collateral posted by the counterparty is available (Qτ+δ >
0, Mτ > 0); this means that the investor has to have money and can use some
collateral to obtain it. We have three sub-cases:
• the collateral (Mτ +NCτ ) is not enough to match the value of the remaining
contract so the investor suffer a loss, then the investor gets back the initial
margin so we have ητ+δ = RC(Qτ+δ −Mτ −NCτ ) −NIτ;
• the collateral is enough to match the value of the contract, but Mτ < Qτ+δ,
so the investor does nott suffer any loss and gets back his initial margin. In
this case ητ+δ = Qτ+δ −Mτ −NCτ −NIτ;
• the variation margin is enough to match Qτ+δ. Hence if the investor does
not default during the margin period of risk we have ητ+δ = Qτ+δ −Mτ −
NCτ −N
I
τ. On the other hand if the investor defaults during the margin period
of risk we have ητ+δ = (Qτ+δ −Mτ −NIτ)+ − R ′I(Qτ+δ −Mτ −N
I
τ)
− −NCτ .
In this case in fact the investor must give back to the counterparty the remaining
margin collateral and can use his initial margin to alleviate the losses.
2. Now suppose that Qτ+δ > 0 but Mτ < 0, so that the investor measures a positive
value for the contract and the available margin collateral has been posted by the
investor itself. Then the investor must have money back both for the contract and
the collateral. We distinguish two cases:
• the counterparty’s initial margin is not enough to match Qτ+δ then the
investor suffers a loss and ητ+δ = RC(Qτ+δ −NCτ ) − R ′CMτ −N
I
τ.
• the counterparty’s initial margin is enough to match Qτ+δ and so he can
only suffer losses on the variation margin. Hence we have ητ+δ = −(Qτ+δ−
Mτ −N
C
τ )
− + RCτ (Qτ+δ −Mτ −N
C
τ )
+ −NIτ.
3. Suppose that Qτ+δ < 0 and that Mτ > 0, meaning that the investor has to give
back money both for the contract and for the margin account. In this case if the
investor does not default during the margin period of risk then he will be able to
pay both the value of the contract and the margin collateral to the counterparty.
Hence ητ+δ = Qτ+δ −Mτ −NCτ −NIτ. If on the other hand the investor defaults
in the margin period of risk we have
ητ+δ = −RI(Qτ+δ−N
I
τ)
−−R ′I((Qτ+δ−N
I
τ)
+−Mτ)
−+((Qτ+δ−N
I
τ)
+−Mτ)
+−NCτ .
This represents the fact that the investor will use his initial margin account to
repay both its debt for the contract and the variation margin.
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4. Finally consider the case Qτ+δ < 0 and Mτ < 0, meaning that the investor must
pay for the contract and receive some money for the variation margin. Here we
distinguish three sub-cases:
• if the variation margin covers Qτ+δ but the counterparty initial margin does
not cover the possible losses on the variation margin the investor suffers a
loss and we have ητ+δ = R ′C(Qτ+δ −Mτ −N
C
τ ) −N
I
τ;
• if the variation margin covers Qτ+δ and the counterparty initial margin
suffices to cover the losses on the variation margin then the investor does
not suffer any loss and we have ητ+δ = Qτ+δ −Mτ −NCτ −NIτ;
• lastly if the variation margin does not cover Qτ, if the band does not default
in the margin period of risk we have ητ+δ = Qτ+δ −Mτ −NCτ −NIτ. On the
other hand if the investor defaults we have
ητ+δ = (Qτ+δ −Mτ −N
I
τ)
+ − RI(Qτ+δ −Mτ −N
I
τ)
− −NCτ .
This equation means that the investor will use its initial margin to repay the
counterparty.
Of course we can replicate a similar reasoning to cover the cases in which the
investor defaults before the counterparty. If we do so and we sum up all the cases, we
obtain the following formula for the close out cash-flows:
θτ+δ = Qτ+δ
− 1{τC<τI+δ}LGDC((Qτ+δ −N
C
τ )
+ −M+τ )
+
− 1{τC<τI+δ}LGD
′
C(−(Qτ+δ −N
C
τ )
− +M−τ )
+
+ 1{τI<τC+δ}LGDI(−(Qτ+δ −N
I
τ)
− +M−τ )
−
+ 1{τI<τC+δ}LGD
′
I((Qτ+δ −N
I
τ)
+ −M+τ )
−.
If we suppose LGDI = LGD ′I and LGDI = LGD
′
I we obtain
θτ+δ = Qτ+δ
− 1{τC<τI+δ}LGDC(Qτ+δ −N
C
τ −Mτ)
+
+ 1{τI<τC+δ}LGDI(Qτ+δ −N
C
τ −Mτ)
−
(3.3.1)
If we set δ = 0, and NI = NC = 0 we obtain:
θτ = Qτ − 1{τC<τI}LGDC(Qτ −Mτ)
+ + 1{τI<τC}LGDI(Qτ −Mτ)
−,
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which can be easily shown to be equal to formula 2.3.1, with ∆ = 0, that we already
obtained.
In order to derive an expression for Vt including the Total Valuation Adjustment
Θt we now show that Et[D(0, τ+ δ)Θτ+δ] = D(0, t)Θt for t < τ+ δ. We could use the
martingale property of D(0, t, r)Θt to derive the just mentioned equation but we prefer
to give also a direct proof. In fact we have:
Et[D(0, τ+ δ, r)Θτ+δ] =
Et
[
D(0, τ+ δ, r)Eτ+δ
[∫T
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu − 1{τ<T}θτ+δ
]]
Et
[
Eτ+δ
[
D(0, τ+ δ, r)
(∫T
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu − 1{τ<T}θτ+δ
)]]
= D(0, t, r)Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)
(∫T
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu − 1{τ<T}θτ+δ
)]
= D(0, t, r)Et
[(∫T
o
D(t,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
o
D(t,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu − 1{τ<T}D(t, τ+ δ, r)θτ+δ
)]
= D(0, t, r)Θt
Moreover if t < τ, we have
∫t
oD(t,u, r)dpiu =
∫t
oD(t,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu and so Θt =
Vt − Vt since:
Θt = Et
[∫T
t
D(t,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
t
D(t,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu −D(t, τ+ δ, r)1{τ<T}θτ+δ
]
= Et
[∫T
t
D(t,u, r)dpiu
]
− Et
[∫τ
t
D(t,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu +D(t, τ+ δ, r)1{τ<T}θτ+δ
]
= Vt − Vt.
We are ready to prove the following:
Lemma 3.3.3. For t < τ we have:
Vt−Vt = Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)1{τ<T}
(
Vτ+δ +
∫
[τ,τ+δ]
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu − θτ+δ
)]
(3.3.2)
Proof. Remembering that Et[D(0, τ+ δ, r)Θτ+δ] = D(0, t, r)Θt we obtain, for t < τ:
Vt − Vt =
Et[D(0, τ+ δ, r)Θτ+δ]
D(0, t, r)
= Et[D(t, τ+ δ, r)Θτ+δ]
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To prove the thesis we manipulate the expression Et[D(t, τ+ δ, r)Θτ+δ]:
Et[D(t, τ+ δ, r)Θτ+δ]
= Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)
(
Eτ+δ
[∫T
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu
]
− Eτ+δ
[∫τ
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu
]
− 1{τ<T}θτ+δ
)]
= Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)
(
Eτ+δ
[∫ (τ+δ)∧T
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu +
∫T
(τ+δ)∧T
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu
]
− Eτ+δ
[∫τ
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu
]
− 1{τ<T}θτ+δ
)]
.
We have three cases:
• If τ+ δ < T we have:∫τ+δ
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu =
∫
[τ,τ+δ]
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu,
where the last integrand comprises coupons at time τ. We can therefore write:
Et[D(t, τ+ δ, r)Θτ+δ] =
= Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)
(
Eτ+δ
[∫T
τ+δ
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu +
∫τ+δ
τ
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu
]
− 1{τ<T}θτ+δ
)]
= Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)
(
Vτ+δ +
∫τ+δ
τ
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu − 1{τ<T}θτ+δ
)]
• If τ > T we have Θτ+δ = 0, since having τ = τ∧ T = T implies:∫T
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu =
∫τ
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu
• Lastly if τ 6 T 6 τ+ δ we have that:∫T
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu −
∫τ
o
D(τ+ δ,u, r)1{u<τ}dpiu
=
∫
[τ,T ]
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu =
∫
[τ,τ+δ]
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu
Where the last equality follows from the fact that pi ≡ 0 on ]T , τ+ δ]. Also in this
case we have
Et[D(t, τ+ δ, r)Θτ+δ]
= Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)
(
Vτ+δ +
∫
[τ,τ+δ]
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu − 1{τ<T}θτ+δ
)]
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Thus in general we may write:
Et[D(t, τ+ δ, r)Θτ+δ] = Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)1{τ<T}
(
Vτ+δ +
∫
[τ,τ+δ]
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu − θτ+δ
)]
.
The thesis easily follows from the last expression.
he following Lemma will be useful in order to derive useful representations of the
formula 3.3.2:
Lemma 3.3.4. Suppose that ϕu is an F-predictable process. We consider two conditionally
independent default times τI, τC generated by Cox processes with F-intensity rates λIt, λCt . If
we denote τ = τC ∧ τI we have:
Et[1{τ>t}1{τ<T}1{τC<τI+δ}ϕτ+δ] =
= 1{τ>t}E
[∫T
t
ϕu+δD(t,u, λI + λC)(λCu + λ
I
u(1 −D(u,u+ δ, λ
C)))du |Ft
]
.
Proof. We start noting that:
1{τ>t}1{τ<T}1{τC<τI+δ}ϕτ+δ = 1{τ>t}(1{τC<T}1{τC<τI}ϕτC+δ+1{τI<T}1{τI<τC<τI+δ}ϕτI+δ).
Let’s begin with: 1{τC<T}1{τC<τI}ϕτC+δ. We note that:
1{τ>t}1{τC<T}1{τC<τI}ϕτC+δ = −
∫T
t
1{u<τI}ϕu+δ d1{τC>u}.
From what we have seen about Cox processes, thanks to Theorem 1.3.12 we have:
1 − 1{τC>u} =Mu +
∫u∧τC
0
λCs ds,
where Mt is a G-martingale and so d1{τC>u} = −dMu − λ
C
u1{τC>u}du. For the second
term we have:
1{τ>t}1{τI<T}1{τI<τC<τI+δ}ϕτI+δ = −
∫T
t
1{u<τC<u+δ}ϕu+δ d1{τI>u},
where analogously to what we saw before: d1{τI>u} = −dM
′
u − λ
I
u1{τI>u}du.
Thanks to formula (1.1.1) we have:
Et[1{τ>t}1{τ<T}1{τC<τI+δ}ϕτ+δ] = 1{τ>t}D(0, t, λ
I+λC)−1E[1{τ>t}1{τ<T}1{τC<τI+δ}ϕτ+δ |Ft].
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Now we can write
E[1{τ>t}1{τ<T}1{τC<τI+δ}ϕτ+δ |Ft] =
= E
[∫T
t
1{u<τI}ϕu+δ(dMu + λ
C
u1{τC>u}du) +
∫T
t
1{u<τC<u+δ}ϕu+δ(dM
′
u + λ
I
u1{τI>u}du) |Ft
]
Since Mu and M ′u are G-martingales, then they are also F-martingales. Under suit-
able regularity assumptions[1] the integral with respect to a martingale is a martingale
and so E[
∫T
t ϕudMu |Ft] =
∫t
t ϕudMu = 0. Hence we can write:
E[1{τ>t}1{τ<T}1{τC<τI+δ}ϕτ+δ |Ft] =
= E
[∫T
t
1{u<τI}ϕu+δλ
C
u1{τC>u}du+
∫T
t
1{u<τC<u+δ}ϕu+δλ
I
u1{τI>u}du |Ft
]
= E
[∫T
t
1{u<τI}ϕu+δλ
C
u1{τC>u}du |Ft
]
+ E
[∫T
t
1{u<τC<u+δ}ϕu+δλ
I
u1{τI>u}du |Ft
]
=
∫T
t
E
[
1{u<τI}ϕu+δλ
C
u1{τC>u} |Ft
]
du+
∫T
t
E
[
1{u<τC<u+δ}ϕu+δλ
I
u1{τI>u} |Ft
]
du,
where we only exchanged the integral sign and the conditional expectation. The last
expression can be written as:
∫T
t
E
[
E
[
1{u<τI}ϕu+δλ
C
u1{τC>u} |Fu+δ
]
|Ft
]
du
+
∫T
t
E
[
E
[
1{u<τC<u+δ}ϕu+δλ
I
u1{τI>u} |Fu+δ
]
|Ft
]
du
=
∫T
t
E
[
ϕu+δλ
C
uE
[
1{u<τI}1{τC>u} |Fu+δ
]
|Ft
]
du
+
∫T
t
E
[
ϕu+δλ
I
uE
[
1{u<τC<u+δ}1{τI>u} |Fu+δ
]
|Ft
]
du.
here we conditioned with respect to a bigger filtration Fu+δ. We proceed rewriting the
[1]for example we can suppose E
[∫T
0 ϕ
2
ud[M]u
]
<∞.
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last term:
=
∫T
t
E
[
ϕu+δλ
C
uE
[
1{u<τI} |Fu+δ
]
E
[
1{τC>u} |Fu+δ
]
|Ft
]
du
+
∫T
t
E
[
ϕu+δλ
I
uE
[
1{u<τC<u+δ} |Fu+δ
]
E
[
1{τI>u} |Fu+δ
]
|Ft
]
du
=
∫T
t
E
[
ϕu+δλ
C
uD(0,u, λ
I)D(0,u, λC) |Ft
]
du
+
∫T
t
E
[
ϕu+δλ
I
u(D(0,u, λ
C) −D(0,u+ δ, λC))D(0,u, λI) |Ft
]
du
=
∫T
t
E
[
ϕu+δλ
C
uD(0,u, λ
I)D(0,u, λC) |Ft
]
du
+
∫T
t
E
[
ϕu+δλ
I
u(1 −D(u,u+ δ, λ
C))D(0,u, λC)D(0,u, λI) |Ft
]
du
= E
[∫T
t
ϕu+δλ
C
uD(0,u, λ
I)D(0,u, λC)du
+
∫T
t
ϕu+δλ
I
u(1 −D(u,u+ δ, λ
C))D(0,u, λC)D(0,u, λI)du |Ft
= E
[∫T
t
ϕu+δD(0,u, λI + λC)(λCu + λ
I
u(1 −D(u,u+ δ, λ
C)))du |Ft
]
.
In these last steps we used the conditional independence of the default times and the
fact that since they are generated by a Cox process,
E
[
1{u<τX} |Fu+δ
]
= E
[
1{u<τX} |Fu
]
= D(0,u, λX)
for X ∈ {I,C}, as shown by formula 1.3.2. Putting back together what we obtained we
have the thesis.
We now give a theorem analogous to 2.3.4:
Theorem 3.3.5. Suppose that we have the F-intensity rates λIt, λCt of the two conditionally
independent default times τI, τC generated by a Cox process. Moreover suppose that LGDI =
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LGD ′I and LGDI = LGD
′
I, then we have for t < τ:
Vt = Vt
− E
[∫T
t
(λCu + λ
I
u)D(t,u+ δ, r+ λ
I + λC)
(
Vu+δ −Qu+δ +
∫u+δ
u
D(u+ δ, s, r)dpiu
)
du|Ft
]
− E
[∫T
t
(λCu + λ
I
u(1 −D(t, t+ δ, λ
C)))D(t,u, r+ λI + λC)LGDC(Qu+δ −Mu −NCu)
+du|Ft
]
+ E
[∫T
t
(λIu + λ
C
u(1 −D(t, t+ δ, λ
I)))D(t,u, r+ λI + λC)LGDI(Qu+δ −Mu −NIu)
−du|Ft
]
.
(3.3.3)
Proof. Plugging-in equation 3.3.1 into 3.3.2 we obtain:
Vt = Vt − Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)1{τ<T}
(
Vτ+δ −Qτ+δ +
∫
[τ,τ+δ]
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu
)]
− Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)1{τ<T}1{τC<τI+δ}LGDC(Qτ+δ −N
C
τ −Mτ)
+
]
+ Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)1{τ<T} + 1{τI<τC+δ}LGDI(Qτ+δ −N
C
τ −Mτ)
−
]
.
We start applying Lemma 3.3.4 with ϕτ+δ = D(t, τ+δ, r)LGDC(Qτ+δ−NCτ −Mτ)+.
Then we apply the same Lemma but with exchanged default times and ϕτ+δ =
D(t, τ+ δ, r)LGDI(Qτ+δ −NIτ −Mτ)−. This leads us to obtain:
Vt = Vt − Et
[
D(t, τ+ δ, r)1{τ<T}
(
Vτ+δ −Qτ+δ +
∫
[τ,τ+δ]
D(τ+ δ,u, r)dpiu
)]
− E
[∫T
t
(λCu + λ
I
u(1 −D(t, t+ δ, λ
C)))D(t,u, r+ λI + λC)LGDC(Qu+δ −Mu −NCu)
+du|Ft
]
+ E
[∫T
t
(λIu + λ
C
u(1 −D(t, t+ δ, λ
I)))D(t,u, r+ λI + λC)LGDI(Qu+δ −Mu −NIu)
−du|Ft
]
.
The thesis can then be obtained by noting that similarly to Lemma 3.3.4, we can prove
that:
Et[1{τ>t}1{τ<T}ϕτ+δ] = 1{τ>t}E
[∫T
t
ϕu+δD(t,u, λI + λC)(λCu + λ
I
u)du |Ft
]
.
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3.3.3 Collateral Practice
Since the previous chapter we used rather generic stochastic processes to model the
collateral accounts involved in a transaction. Now we specify some possible forms for
the collateral processes following Brigo et al. [2013b], Brigo et al. [2013a] and Brigo et al.
[2011b].
The simplest form that can be used is the perfect collateralization, i.e. we choose
Mt = Qt. This specification is quite unrealistic because it suppose a continuous
rebalancing of the collateral to follow the fluctuations of the contract’s value. A simple
alternative, is to model a partial collateralization by supposing Mt = αQt where
α ∈ [0, 1[. This model accounts for the mismatch between the variation margin and the
contract’s value, that may be due to the collateral schedule or to the fact that collateral
is not always cash but can be some type of bond or similar security. A more precise
model of real collateralization schemes has to take into account that collateral may be
posted only at certain discrete time instants t1 . . . tn and only if the value of the contract
crosses a certain threshold. Moreover collateral is posted only if the difference between
the margin account and the contract’s value exceeds a minimum transfer amount.
For what concerns the initial margins, since they essentially are used to cover the
losses due to a mismatch between the variation margin and the value of the contract
when the close-out cash-flow is payed, then we can model the initial margins as some
risk measure associated with the period of time between the last collateral payment
date and the close-out payment.
3.4 Trading with Central Counterparties
After the financial crisis of 2007 there has been an effort to reduce risks due to coun-
terparty defaults. In particular the OTC derivative market is seen as a big risk source.
One proposed solution is to move OTC trades to central counterparties (CCP) (see for
example Heller and Vause [2012] or Pirrong [2011]).CCPs are commercial entities that
interpose themselves between the parties of a contract. More precisely the transaction
between I and C will be split in two deals one for each party and the CCP. In every
such deal there is a so called clearing member that mediates between the party and the
CCP. The overall process is organized as follows:
• Each party replace the original deal entering a trade, that replicates the original
one, with a different clearing member.
• Each clearing member offsets the position with the CCP. There are no more obliga-
tions between the parties but only between the parties and the CCP interposition
47
3.4. Trading with Central Counterparties
of the clearing members.
• Each party posts the variation margin when needed. This makes the CCP neutral
with respect to the variation margin, because if the mark to market is favorable to
one party, and thus the CCP would have to post variation margin, on the other
hand the other party will be posting the same amount to the CCP.
• Only the parties involved in the original contract (not the CCP nor the clearing
members) will post initial margin to the CCP to cover additional risks.
• If a party defaults, then the other party keep the variation margin (if due), and
can obtain the initial margin from the CCP. If a clearing member defaults, there
are procedures that insures that he gets substituted.
Of course to make this mechanism work, one has to assume that the margining
frequency is appropriate, that the CCP is highly capitalized and not risky, and that the
initial margin is appropriate. There is a great debate on how effective CCP clearing is
for what concerns risk mitigation. What emerges (see for example Pirrong [2011]) is that
in order to have a working risk management procedure, CCPs should focus on liquid
and standardized products. Moreover a CCP is usually highly specialized, meaning
that it clears only certain type of deals, and operates only in a certain geographical area.
This rises concerns about the efficiency of CCPs as a countermeasure to counterparty
risk. In fact it is possible that this specialization reduces the netting benefit of CCP
clearing, as can be seen in Duffie and Zhu [2011] and Cont and Kokholm [2014]. But
there are also problems if we are able to solve the specialization issue, in fact if few
CCPs end up clearing most of the OTC bilateral deals then their default can be a big
issue. Thus CCP clearing and its consequences are a still debated research topic.
From a modeling perspective in case of pricing a CCP cleared contract we choose
either I or C to be the CCP and we set an high value for its LGD coefficient (e.g. 95%),
and a zero value for its initial margin (since only the client of the CCP posts initial
margin).
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Interest Rate Modeling
Since we are interested in applying what we saw in the previous chapters, to interest
rate contracts, now we describe precisely how we model interest rates and we explain
how some interest rate contracts work.
4.1 Classical Interest Rate Theory
We assume to have an arbitrage free market model, with a martingale measure Q where
all the information available is modeled by a filtration G = (Gt)t>0. We suppose as we
did before that in our market is present a bank account Bt which follows the dynamic
given by {
dBt = rtBtdt
B0 = 1
where rt is the risk-free rate or short rate. Furthermore as usual we indicate the discount
factor between times s and t with the notation D(s, t, r).
4.1.1 Basic Interest Rate Products
We now introduce the most basic product related to interest rates: the zero coupon bond.
Definition 4.1.1. A zero coupon bond with maturity T is a contract that grants the holder
one unit of currency at time T with no intermediate payments (thus named zero
coupon).
We write P(t, T) the price of a zero coupon bond at time t with maturity T . Since
the payoff at time T is 1 we have that by no arbitrage the price must satisfy
P(t, T) = Et
[
e−
∫T
t rudu1
]
= Et[D(t, T , r)].
Remark 4.1.2. In pricing a zero coupon bond we supposed to already have chosen a
single martingale measure. If we consider a market where the only traded products are
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the zero coupon bonds, generally this market will be incomplete and thus there won’t
be a unique martingale measure and thus a unique choice for the zero coupon bond
price. On the other hand we remark that after choosing a price for a zero coupon bond
with a certain maturity, the prices of the others follow by non arbitrage arguments.
More details on the subject can be found in chapter 23 of Björk [2004]. We remark that
instead we suppose to have a market model with a specified martingale measure.
Definition 4.1.3. The collection of prices of zero coupon bonds for different maturities is
called term structure.
We assume that in our market model there are zero coupon bonds for every maturity,
and that their prices are differentiable with respect to T . In real market zero coupon
bond are not the most liquid interest rate product and are traded only on certain
maturities. On the other hand zero coupon bonds are the usual building block of
interest rate theory for their simplicity.
Until now we specified only a type of interest rate, the short rate, and now that we
have the definition of zero coupon bond we can introduce a few other rates.
Definition 4.1.4. Consider three time instants t 6 S 6 T .
• the simple spot rate L(t, T), is the simply compounded rate such that investing
P(t, T) units of currency at time t we obtain one unit of currency at time T . Thus
(1 + L(t, T)(T − t))P(t, T) = 1,
or equivalently
L(t, T) =
1 − P(t, T)
(T − t)P(t, T)
.
• the continuously compounded spot rate R(t, T), is the continuously compounded
rate such that investing P(t, T) units of currency at time t, we obtain one unit of
currency at time T :
eR(t,T)(T−t)P(t, T) = 1,
and thus
R(t, T) = −
ln(P(t, T))
T − t
.
Remark 4.1.5. The simple spot rate is often called the LIBOR rate. LIBOR is a market
rate determined by a panel of major banks that reflects the simply compounded rate
at which these banks “could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking for and then
accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size”. LIBOR rate is defined for a
certain set of maturities and is calculated every day. Moreover we note that LIBOR
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rate is not based on effective trades but only on banks’ estimates. In principle if we
suppose no arbitrage then there exists only one single risk-free rate, otherwise we
would have arbitrage and so there should be only one risk-free simple spot rate and
thus the naming. In the following sections we try to explain why that is not the case
and how can we model different rates in a consistent way.
So we have defined the spot rates, i.e. interest rates over a period starting now. Now
we turn onto forward rates, and to introduce them we start describing an interest rate
product called Forward Rate Agreement or more simply FRA.
Remark 4.1.6. It should be noted that spot contracts on the market, often start accruing
two days after inception.
Definition 4.1.7. A Forward Rate Agreement is a contract such that now at time t two
parties agree to exchange a fixed rate K with a spot rate L(T ,S) over the time period
[T ,S]. Basically at time S one party pays NK(S− T) units of currency, where N stands
for the notional of the contract, and the other pays NL(T ,S)(S− T).
The payoff of a FRA is N(S − T)(K − L(T ,S)) and will be known at time T . To
compute the price of a FRA at time t we resort to a classical no-arbitrage argument. By
using the definition of the simple spot rate, we obtain that the payoff of the FRA can be
written as
N
(
(S− T)K−
1
P(T ,S)
+ 1
)
.
To obtain 1P(T ,S) at time S we must invest 1 unit of currency at time T because with 1
unit of currency at time T we can buy 1P(T ,S) zero coupon bonds with maturity S. This
investment will give us 1P(T ,S)1 units of currency since a zero coupon bond bought at T
with maturity S will be worth 1 unit of currency at time S. To obtain 1 unit of currency
at T we must buy a zero coupon bond at t thus paying P(t, T). Hence to obtain the
payoff of a FRA, we may buy at t, (S− T)K− 1 zero coupon bonds with maturity S and
sell one zero coupon bond with maturity T for every unit of notional, obtaining that
the price of a FRA at time t must be equal to
FRAt = N(((S− T)K+ 1)P(t,S) − P(t, T)).
The market practice is to choose K in such a way that at inception the contract’s price
equals zero.
Remark 4.1.8. We note that the contract we described differs slightly from the real one
traded on the market. In fact in market’s FRA the payment is anticipated at T and is
discounted from S to T at the LIBOR rate (for more details see Mercurio [2009]).
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This value of K is called simply compounded forward rate and we indicate it as F(t, T ,S).
To be precise we have
F(t, T ,S) =
1
(S− T)
(
P(t, T)
P(t,S)
− 1
)
.
This rate is the fair simply compounded rate between two forward times T and S. What
happens if we consider a forward rate on an “infinitesimal” time interval?
Definition 4.1.9. We call instantaneous forward rate the limit
f(t, T) = lim
S→T+
F(t, T ,S) = lim
S→T+
1
P(t,S)
P(t, T) − P(t,S)
(S− T)
= −
∂P(t,T)
∂T
P(t, T)
= −
∂ ln(P(t, T))
∂T
.
Remark 4.1.10. We note that forward simple rate is a general rate that encompass
the simple spot rate, in fact we have L(t, T) = F(t, t, T). Analogously we have that
r(t) = f(t, t) since
f(t, T) = −
−Et
[
r(T)e−
∫T
t rudu
]
Et
[
e−
∫T
t rudu
] .
Another important property of the instantaneous forward rate is that zero coupon
prices can be expressed in term of it. To be precise we have that
∫T
t
f(t,u)du = −
∫T
t
∂ ln(P(t,u))
∂u
du = −ln(P(t, T)),
and hence
P(t, T) = e−
∫T
t f(t,u)du.
A contract that can be viewed as an extension of a FRA is the Interest Rate Swap, or
IRS.
Definition 4.1.11. An interest rate swap is a contract between two parties that agree to
exchange some amounts of money at times T1 . . . TN. At each date Ti the so called
payer, pays the amount N(Ti − Ti−1)K to the receiver, and receives the amount N(Ti −
Ti−1)L(Ti−1, Ti). The two stream of payments are called respectively the fixed leg and
the floating leg.
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The interest rate swap can be viewed as a stream of FRA on the intervals [Ti−1, Ti]
and thus we obtain that the price of an IRS is
IRSt = N
N∑
i=2
((Ti − Ti−1)K+ 1)P(t, Ti) − P(t, Ti−1)
= N
(
P(t, TN) − P(t, T1) +
N∑
i=2
(Ti − Ti−1)KP(t, Ti)
)
.
As in the FRA, the fixed rate K is chosen in such a way that the contract at inception
has zero price, and this value of K is called swap rate S(T1 . . . TN).
S(T1 . . . TN) =
P(t, T1) − P(t, TN)∑N
i=2(Ti − Ti−1)P(t, Ti)
.
At the moment we note that all the rates we introduced can be expressed either in
term of short rates or instantaneous forward rates. Thus seems natural to specify an
interest rate model by means of its characteristic short rate or instantaneous forward
rate. It must be noted although that these two already mentioned rates are quite
artificial, in the sense that they are not market’s product, instead FRA and swaps are
actively traded instruments and thus one can expect to obtain easily market data for
forward and swap rates. These three objects, namely short rates, instantaneous forward
rates and “market rates” are the main analysis object of three types of interest rate
modeling, i.e. short rate models, HJM models and market models. We are mainly
interested in describing the first two because these are the ones we used for numeric
calculations and thus we will only give a rough idea of what market models are.
4.1.2 Short Rate Models and Affine Processes
To model a short rate process, usually we start by postulating that the short rate
follows a certain dynamic under the measure Q. This dynamic is usually specified by a
stochastic differential equation. A popular way to model an interest rate (but not the
only one) is choosing it from the class of affine processes.
Definition 4.1.12. We say that a short rate process has an affine term structure if
P(t, T) = eA(t,T)−B(t,T)r(t). (4.1.1)
To understand how this relates to the dynamic of rt we start supposing that
drt = µ(t, rt)dt+ σ(t, rt)dWt.
The following is a useful lemma that provides a dynamic for the prices of zero coupon
bonds. For a proof see Björk [2004], chapter 23.
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Lemma 4.1.13. Consider the price of a zero coupon bond as a function of the present time, the
maturity and the present value of the short interest rate, namely P(t, T) = F(t, r(t), T) and
further suppose that F(•, •, T) ∈ C1,2. Then F satisfies
∂F
∂t
+
∂F
∂r
µ(t, r) +
1
2
∂2F
∂2r2
σ(t, r)2 = rF. (4.1.2)
Now we substitute expression (4.1.1) into formula (4.1.2) and we obtain that the
following must hold true:
∂A(t, T)
∂t
−
(
1 +
∂B(t, T)
∂t
)
r− µ(t, T)B(t, T) +
1
2
σ(t, r)2B(t, T)2 = 0. (4.1.3)
Equation (4.1.3) is not guaranteed to have a solution, but it turns out that if we
suppose that µ(t, r) and σ(t, r)2 have an affine expression, i.e.{
µ(t, r) = a(t)r(t) + b(t)
σ(t, r)2 = α(t)r(t) + β(t)
then 4.1.3 becomes
∂A(t, T)
∂t
−b(t)B(t, T)+
1
2
β(t)2B(t, T)2−
(
1 +
∂B(t, T)
∂t
+ a(t)B(t, T) −
1
2
α(t)2B(t, T)2
)
r = 0.
If we fix t and T , since the equation must hold true for every choice of r, then the short
rate coefficient must be zero. So we have the following system of equations, equivalent
to the previous one:
1 +
∂B(t, T)
∂t
+ a(t)B(t, T) −
1
2
α(t)2B(t, T)2 = 0,
∂A(t, T)
∂t
− b(t)B(t, T) +
1
2
β(t)2B(t, T)2 = 0.
The first equation is a so called Riccati equation that involves only B and thus after
solving it (maybe numerically) we can substitute B in the second equation to find A by
means of integration in t.
So we showed that affine coefficients of the short rate dynamics imply an affine
term structure. On the other hand the converse is not generally true.
Remark 4.1.14. What we have just seen is a brief introduction to affine term structure
for interest rates. A more advanced presentation of affine processes, considering for
example a more general dynamic, can be found in Duffie [2005a] and reference therein.
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4.1.3 HJM Framework
Another possibility in interest rate modeling is to specify the instantaneous forward
rate dynamic. A possible choice for doing this is the Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework,
HJM. In this setup we consider a dynamic for the instantaneous forward rate of the
type {
df(t, T) = α(t, T)dt+ σ(t, T)dWt
f(0, T) = fM(0, T)
Where fM(0, T) indicates the instantaneous forward rates implied from the market at
time 0, i.e. now and α(•, T), β(•, T) are adapted processes.
Remark 4.1.15. Note that the maturity T plays the role of a parameter that specifies the
equation for the maturity we are interested in. Moreover we note that the whole market
curve of the instantaneous forward rate is taken as starting data. change
In order to have an arbitrage free model we must make some assumptions on the
coefficients α(t, T) and σ(t, T). These assumptions are necessary because we want the
following to hold true
e−
∫T
t f(t,u)du = P(t, T) = Et
[
e−
∫T
t rudu
]
= Et
[
e−
∫T
t f(u,u)du
]
.
This is verified by definition when we start describing the short rate dynamic, while
when we start from the instantaneous forward rate it turns out that we have to choose
α(t, T) and σ(t, T) such that
α(t, T) = σ(t, T)
∫T
t
σ(t, s)ds.
This condition goes under the name of HJM drift condition. More details can be found
in Björk [2004].
Remark 4.1.16. We say that a process Xt has the Markov property with respect to the
filtration G, or is a Markov process, if for every measurable bounded function f we have
E[f(Xt) | Gs] = E[f(Xt) | σ(Xs)].
We note that under a general specification for the f(t, T) dynamic, the short rate
rt is not guaranteed to be a Markov process. This is different from what happens
specifying a short rate dynamic because in this case, being rt the solution to a stochastic
differential equation, it is guaranteed to be a Markov process. A first result is the one
obtained in Carverhill [1994]. In this paper is shown that if σ(t, T) = ξ(t)θ(t) then
the short rate is a Markov process. Another important result in this direction can be
found in Ritchken and Sankarasubramanian [1995], where the authors prove that if
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σ(t, T) = η(t)e−
∫T
t k(x)dx then we can find a process ϕt such that the two dimensional
process (rt,ϕt) follows a markovian dynamic. The authors also show that the above
mentioned condition is also necessary and not only sufficient. Having a Markov short
rate process is very convenient from a computational point of view as we will see in
the next chapter.
4.1.4 Market Models
To sum up, the short rate approach has the benefit of having a markovian property,
while on the other hand a short rate model tries to explain everything with a unique
process and strive to model a realistic volatility structure for the forward rates (see Björk
[2004]). The HJM modeling framework instead is not guaranteed to provide a Markov
dynamic for the short rate but has the whole forward rate structure as state variable
thus gaining in flexibility. Both the short rate and the instantaneous forward rate aren’t
traded on the market and if we want to use them to price interest rate products we have
to calibrate our model to the market. This means that we have to compute the prices
PModel(parameters) of traded instruments as function of the model’s parameters. The
parameters of the model must then be tweaked so that the prices PModel(parameters)
match the market prices PMarket. An idea to ease this procedure is to model rates that
are traded on the market, such as LIBOR rates or SWAP rates. In practice we choose a
set of maturities we are interested in and then we model the dynamics of the traded
rates we are interested in by means of an SDE. This SDE is usually specified under a
probability measure that is different from Q and some attention has to be put in the
choice of the dynamics to avoid arbitrage possibilities. For a treatment of the LIBOR
market model and other models alike we refer to Brigo and Mercurio [2007] or Björk
[2004].
4.2 Gaussian Two Factors Shifted Model
In this section we introduce a popular short rate model that we will be using for
numerical computations.
4.2.1 From Vasicek Model to G2++
A simple model for the short rate is the Vasicek one. In this model the short rate is
modeled as an Ornstein Uhlenbeck process, i.e. is supposed to satisfy for k, θ,σ positive
constants the following relation:
drt = k(θ− rt)dt+ σdWt. (4.2.1)
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Hence we have for s 6 t that
rt = rse
k(t−s) + θ
(
1 − e−k(t−s)
)
+ σ
∫t
s
e−k(t−u)dWu,
and so we have that rt is normally distributed and
Es[rt] = rse
k(t−s) + θ
(
1 − e−k(t−s)
)
,
Var[rt | Gs] =
σ2
2k
(1 − e−2k(t−s)).
We note that since rt is a normal random variable, then it can assume negative values
and this is one of the drawback of the Vasicek model. On the other hand the Vasicek
model is clearly an affine model and we have that the zero coupon bond price for this
model can be computed as
P(t, T) = eA(t,T)−B(t,T)rt ,
where
B(t, T) =
1
k
(
1 − e−k(T−t)
)
,
A(t, T) =
(
θ−
σ2
2k2
)
(B(t, T) − T + t) −
σ2
4k
B(t, T)2.
Remark 4.2.1. We note that the parameter θ in equation (4.2.1) is a level of mean
reversion, i.e. the rate tends to θ level. The parameter k is the speed of mean reversion.
We note that R(t, T) = A(t,T)(T−t) −
B(t,T)
(T−t) rt, and thus if we want to calculate the
correlation between the rates R(t, T1),R(t, T2) we will obtain
Corr(R(t, T1),R(t, T2)) = Corr
(
A(t, T1)
(T1 − t)
+
B(t, T1)
(T1 − t)
rt,
A(t, T2)
(T2 − t)
+
B(t, T2)
(T2 − t)
rt
)
= 1.
So we have a perfect correlation between rates that refer to different tenors, and that is
not always the case in the real market. To solve this problem we may introduce the two
factors Gaussian model, or G2. In this case we suppose that
rt = xt + yt,
dxt = k(θ− xt)dt+ σdW
1
t ,
dxt = h(δ− xt)dt+ ηdW
2
t .
Further we suppose that the cross-variation process [W1,W2]t = ρt, or in a more
intuitive notation dW1tdW
2
t = ρdt. In this case the bond price reads
P(t, T) = eA(t,T)−B
x(t,T)xt−By(t,T)yt ,
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where Bx or By indicate the usual Vasicek function B written with the parameters of
the equations defining xt or yt dynamic. We can see that in the G2 model
Corr(R(t, T1),R(t, T2)) = Corr
(
Bx(t, T1)
T1 − t
xt +
By(t, T1)
T1 − t
yt,
Bx(t, T2)
T2 − t
xt +
By(t, T2)
T2 − t
yt
)
,
and this quantity depends on the coefficient ρ and is not identically equal to 1. So we
obtained a model that can possibly represent different correlations among different
tenor rates.
We now introduce the two additive factor Gaussian model or G2++, which is a slight
variation of the G2 model designed in such a way that the model can fit perfectly the
initial prices of zero coupon bonds present in the market. We model rt as
rt = xt + yt +ϕ(t),
dxt = −axtdt+ σdW
1
t ,
dyt = −byt + ηdW
2
t ,
x0 = 0,
y0 = 0,
where a,b,σ,η are positive constants, (W1t ,W
2
t) is a two dimensional Brownian motion
such that dW1tdW
2
t = ρdt, with 1 > ρ > −1, and ϕ(t) is a deterministic function
such that ϕ(0) = r0. We further introduce the sigma field F = (Ft)t>0 where Ft =
σ({xs,ys s 6 t}), and we denote Et[•] the conditional expectation with respect to Ft.
We note that we have an explicit expression for rt, namely
rt = xse
−a(t−s) + σ
∫t
s
e−a(t−u)dWu
+ yse
−b(t−s) + η
∫t
s
e−b(t−u)dWu +ϕ(t).
In order to compute the price of a zero coupon bond the following lemma (Brigo and
Mercurio [2007] chapter 4) will be useful.
Lemma 4.2.2. For each t, T the random variable
I(t, T) =
∫T
t
(xu + yu)du
is normally distributed if conditioned with respect to Fs and has mean M(t, T) and variance
V(t, T) given by
M(t, T) =
1 − ea(T−t)
a
xt +
1 − eb(T−t)
b
yt
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and
V(t, T) =
σ2
a2
[
T − t+
2
a
e−a(T−t) −
1
2a
e−2a(T−t) −
3
2a
]
+
η2
b2
[
T − t+
2
b
e−b(T−t) −
1
2b
e−2b(T−t) −
3
2b
]
+
2ρση
ab
[
T − t+
e−a(T−t) − 1
a
+
e−b(T−t) − 1
b
−
e−(a+b)(T−t) − 1
a+ b
]
An important result is the following:
Theorem 4.2.3. The price of a zero-coupon bond can be computed as
P(t, T) = exp
(
−
∫T
t
ϕ(u)du−
1 − ea(T−t)
a
xt
−
1 − eb(T−t)
b
yt +
1
2
V(t, T)
)
.
Proof. For a proof refer to Brigo and Mercurio [2007] chapter 4.
Now we want to investigate how to choose ϕ(t) so that the model fits the initial
market prices of the zero coupon bonds. To do so we again borrow from Brigo and
Mercurio [2007] the following:
Corollary 4.2.4. Suppose that, being PM(0, T) the market price of a zero coupon bond, the
function T → PM(0, T) is differentiable. Then we have P(0, T) = PM(0, T) if and only if
ϕ(T) = fM(0, T) +
σ2
2a2
(1 − e−aT )2 +
η2
2b2
(1 − e−bT )2
+ ρ
ση
ab
(1 − e−aT )(1 − e−bT ),
(4.2.2)
where fM(0, T) = ∂log(P
M(0,T))
∂T . Equivalently
exp
[
−
∫T
t
ϕ(u)du
]
=
PM(0, T)
PM(0, t)
exp
[
−
1
2
(V(0, T) − V(0, t))
]
. (4.2.3)
Hence the zero-coupon bond prices are given by
P(t, T) =
PM(0, T)
PM(0, t)
exp(A(t, T)), (4.2.4)
where
A(t, T) =
1
2
(V(t, T) − V(0, T) + V(0, t))
−
1 − ea(T−t)
a
xt −
1 − eb(T−t)
b
yt.
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Proof. By Theorem 4.2.3, we have the thesis if and only if
PM(0, T) = exp
(
−
∫T
0
ϕ(u)du+
1
2
V(0, T)
)
. (4.2.5)
Then the formula (4.2.2) is obtained by taking the logarithm and differentiating the
previous expression. Formula (4.2.3) follows equation (4.2.5). Lastly equation (4.2.4)
follows by formula (4.2.3) and Theorem 4.2.3.
So now we have a way to choose ϕ(t) so that our model fits the market zero coupon
bond prices. From a computational point of view is worth noticing that what really
matters to compute the bond prices is not ϕ(t) but the exponential of its integral. Thus
one does not need to differentiate the function T → PM(0, T). This step would be prone
to errors since usually the values for PM(0, T) are obtained by interpolation.
We close this section by mentioning that many closed formulas to price interest rate
products can be found under the G2++ short rate model, mainly thanks to its Gaussian
distribution. This and the fact that it can fit the initial market prices of the zero coupon
bonds make it a popular interest rate model.
4.3 CIR++ Model
Until now we showed short rate models that have a diffusion coefficient that does not
depend on rt. On the other hand in the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross model ,CIR , we have:
drt = k(θ− rt)dt+ σ
√
rtdWt, (4.3.1)
with k, θ,σ positive constants. For what concerns the existence and uniqueness of a
strong solution for equation (4.3.1) there is a general result that guarantees both, if the
drift term is Lipschitz continuous and the diffusion term is α-Holder with 1 > α > 12 .
For the existence one can refer to the constructive proof in Yamada [1978] and for
the uniqueness to Yamada et al. [1971]. Furthermore if we impose the so called Feller
condition 2kθ > σ2 we have that the short rate remains strictly positive (Brigo and
Mercurio [2007]). In the case of the CIR model we have that the short rate has a
chi-squared distribution as can be seen in Brigo and Mercurio [2007]. Furthermore
we have that the model is affine and for the bond price we have (Brigo and Mercurio
[2007])
P(t, T) = A(t, T)e−B(t,T)rt
where where we denote
A(t, T) =
(
2h exp((k+ h)(T − t)/2
2h+ (h+ k)( exp((T − t)h) − 1)
)2kθ/σ2
(4.3.2)
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and
B(t, T) =
2(exp((T − t)h) − 1)
2h+ (h+ k)(exp((T − t)h− 1)
(4.3.3)
h =
√
k2 + 2σ2.
Now we want to extend the CIR model to fit the initial bond prices. In order to do so
we proceed as we did in the G2++ case, i.e. we define a new model, called CIR++, for
rt
rt = xt +ϕ(t),
dxt = k(θ− xt)dt+ σ
√
xtdWt,
where xt is a CIR process and ϕ(t) is a deterministic function. We see that, if we
indicate Px(t, T) the price of a zero-coupon bond when the short rate mode is xt, and
P(t, T) the price of the same zero coupon bond under our CIR++ model, we have
P(t, T) = Px(t, T) exp
[
−
∫T
t
ϕ(u)du
]
.
The following proposition is analogous to Corollary 4.2.4.
Corollary 4.3.1. Suppose that, being PM(0, T) the market price of a zero coupon bond, the
function T → PM(0, T) is differentiable. Then we have P(0, T) = PM(0, T) if and only if
ϕ(T) = fM(0, T) − fx(0, T), (4.3.4)
where fM(0, T) = ∂log(P
M(0,T))
∂T and f
x(0, T) = ∂log(P
x(0,T))
∂T . Equivalently
exp
[
−
∫T
t
ϕ(u)du
]
=
PM(0, T)Px(0, t)
PM(0, t)Px(0, T)
. (4.3.5)
Hence the zero-coupon bond prices are given by
P(t, T) =
PM(0, T)Px(0, t)
PM(0, t)Px(0, T)
Px(t, T). (4.3.6)
Proof. The proof of this result proceeds exactly as the one for Corollary 4.2.4 and thus
is omitted. For a reference see Brigo and Mercurio [2007].
Remark 4.3.2. We anticipate that we are not going to use the CIR++ dynamic to model
an interest rate but instead to model default intensities of two firms. This is possible
because if we choose a Cox process approach to model our default times then the
conditional survival probabilities are the analogous of discount factors.
61
4.4. Multi-curve Framework
4.4 Multi-curve Framework
As we saw in the first section of this chapter, classical interest rate modeling is based
upon non arbitrage relations such as the one between forward rates and zero-coupon
bond prices. In recent years, and in particular since 2007, some of these non arbitrage
constraints failed to hold in the market. As an example basis-swap[1] spread quotes
differ significantly from zero, while they should be zero if these non arbitrage relations
still hold true. To see what happened let’s start with an example:
Example 4.4.1. Consider a FRA with payoff (T − t)(L(t, T) − K). To replicate its payoff
we may proceed as follows
• At time 0 we buy a zero coupon bond for P(0, t), and we borrow 1+K(T−t)1+L(0,T)T until
time T ;
• at time t we have a return of 1 due to the bond, that we invest buying 1P(t,T) unit
of a zero-coupon bond with maturity T ;
• at time T we have 1P(t,T) = 1 + L(t, T)(T − t) because of our bond and we have
to give back 1 + K(T − t) because of our debt. Thus, summing up, our payoff is
(T − t)(L(t, T) − K) that replicates the one of a FRA.
Since August 2007 it is no longer possible to assume that the inter-bank market
is risk-free. In fact the Lehman Brothers default is an example of how such risk is
concrete. Assuming the inter-bank market as risk-free is what allow to treat the LIBOR
rate as a risk-free rate and thus make it possible to have a unique term structure. In
fact the LIBOR rate in a FRA is a market observable, and can be substituted with
1
(T−t)
[
1
P(t,T) − 1
]
only assuming that the LIBOR rate does not include a credit risk or
liquidity risk component Mercurio [2009]. This is not the case because since banks can
fail there is a credit risk component, while the liquidity risk component arises from the
fact that LIBOR is an offered rate, meaning that is not based on real transactions but
on what some major bank thinks that is the rate it will be able to fund itself on the
market. What happens when we try to replicate a FRA is our creditworthiness and our
liquidity will be reflected by the rates for borrowing or lending money and these rates
are thus not guaranteed to be the LIBOR quoted rate. To address this issue a possible
solution that we describe in the next section is to model each LIBOR rate (with its own
tenor) as a different asset, in particular different from the risk-free zero spot rate. This
setup where we have different term structures for different tenors is called multi-curve
framework.
[1]A contract that involves the exchange of two floating rates, as an example LIBOR 3m vs LIBOR 6m
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A consequence of what we just sated is that we can no longer price FRA and IRS as
we did before. For example consider a FRA with payoff
N(S− T) (K− L(T ,S)) ,
then we can’t express the rate L(T ,S) as 1(S−T)
(
1
P(T ,S) + 1
)
, because this formula comes
from an arbitrage free relation that is no more satisfied. Then we have to resort to other
techniques as illustrated by Henrard [2010] and Mercurio [2009].
4.5 Markov HJM Model with Stochastic Volatility
In this section we describe an HJM, markovian framework for multi-curve modeling
following Moreni and Pallavicini [2013]. We model both an instantaneous risk-free
forward rate f(t, T) and a family of forward rates Ft(T , x) with maturity T and tenor x.
More precisely we have under the risk neutral probability Q:
df(t, T) =σ∗t(T)
[∫T
t
σt(u)du dt+ dWt
]
, (4.5.1)
dFt(T , x)
k(T , x) + Ft(T , x)
=Σ∗t(T , x)
[∫T
t
σt(u)du dt+ dWt
]
, (4.5.2)
where σt(T) is a family of stochastic vector processes parametrized by T , Σt(T , x) is a
family of vector valued processes parametrized by T and x, Wt is a multidimensional
Brownian motion, and k(T , x) is a deterministic function such that limx→0 xk(T , x) = 1.
For fixed t, T , x we have Wt,σt(T),Σt(T , x) ∈ RN. For any matrix V we indicate its
transpose as V∗, note that this applies also to vectors, that we interpret as single column
matrix. We see that the risk free dynamic is analogous to an HJM model, and for
the risk free forward rates Et(T , x) = 1x
(
exp
[∫T
T−x f(t,u)du
]
− 1
)
we have, using Ito
formula:
dEt(T , x)
1
x + Et(T , x)
=
(∫T
T−x
σt(u)
∗du
)[∫T
t
σt(u)du dt+ dWt
]
.
We now make some supposition on the shape of the volatility functions to ensure
a markovian specification of our model. In doing so we again follow Moreni and
Pallavicini [2013]. We suppose that:
σt(T) =σt(T , T , 0, )
Σt(T , x) =
∫T
T−x
σt(u, T , x)du,
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where
σt(u, T , x) =h(t)q(u, T , x)g(t,u),
g(t,u) = exp
(
−
∫u
t
λ(y)dy
)
,
q(u,u, 0) =1,
where ht is a N×N matrix process, q(u, T , x) is a deterministic N×N diagonal matrix
function, and λ(y) is a deterministic N dimensional vector function. We also define
some auxiliary functions that will be useful in calculating the solution to equations
(4.5.1) and (4.5.2). We define
Xit =
N∑
k=1
∫t
0
gi(s, t)
(
hik,sdWk,s + (h
∗
shs)ik
∫t
s
gk(s,y)dy ds
)
, i = 1 . . .N
Yikt =
∫t
0
gi(s, t)(h∗shs)ikgk(s, t)ds i,k = 1 . . .N
and
G0(t, T0, T1) =
∫T1
T0
g(t,y)dy
G(t, T0, T1, T , x) =
∫T1
T0
g(t,y)q(y, T , x)dy
Once we have established the notation, we can proceed to solve equations (4.5.1),(4.5.2).
In order to do this one can for example follow Beyna [2013]. The idea is to integrate
equations (4.5.1),(4.5.2) and to group together the terms that depend on the value of the
volatility process on the interval [0, t] to form the Xt and Yt terms. Doing so we have:
Ft(T , x) = −k(T , x) + exp
[
ln((k(T , x) + F0(T , x)))
+G(t, T − x, T , T , x)∗
(
Xt + Yt
(
G0(t, t, T) −
1
2
G(t, T − x, T , T , x)
))]
,
ft(T) = f0(T) + g(t, T)∗ (Xt + YtG0(t, t, T)) .
Furthermore it can be shown that the processes Xi and Yik follow
dXi =
N∑
k=1
(Yikt − λi(t)X
i
t)dt+ h
∗
tdWt,
dYikt =[(h
∗
tht)ik − (λi(t) + λk(t))Y
ik
t ]dt.
(4.5.3)
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From these two last equations is clear that the process χt = (Xt, Yt) has te Markov
property. The rates ft(T) and Ft(T , x) are deterministic functions of χt thus ensuring
a Markov specification for our model. Until now we described a general framework
that can be specialized to different models. For example we have the choice on how
to model the volatility σt(u, T , x). It can be seen (Moreni and Pallavicini [2014]) that if
we choose N = 2 and we suppose q to be the identity matrix, then we obtain a G2++
model for the short rate. Another interesting choice is to assume a stochastic volatility
process, for example a square root diffusion. This can be done by setting:
k(T , x) =
e−γx
x
,
ht =
√
VtσˆR,
dVt = k(θ− Vt)dt+ ε
√
VtdW
0
t ,
V0 = v,
gi(t, T) = e−λ
i(T−t),
qij(u, T , x) = eη
ix1{i=j},
where
• being ρi,j = [W
i,Wj]t
t the correlation matrix between the Wiener processes Wi we
define R such that ρ = RR∗;
• σˆ is a constant diagonal matrix;
• k, θ, ε, v are positive constants;
• λ,η are constant vectors.
Summing up we described a multi-curve HJM framework that encompasses various
model specifications. Such specifications include the popular G2++ short rate model or
a stochastic volatility model. Moreover these model are guaranteed to have markovian
properties by the framework specification.
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CHAPTER 5
Numerical Methods and Results
In this chapter we review the numerical methods we used to produce some simulations
and we illustrate the results of our numerical computations.
5.1 Techniques
We start by reviewing some of the numerical methods we used the most in our
computations.
5.1.1 Monte Carlo Simulation
Suppose that we want to compute the quantity E[X] for a certain random variable X.
One possible way to do this is by means of a Monte Carlo simulation. We proceed as
follows:
• first we simulate the variable X, to do so we typically generate an N-dimensional
vector X such that each component Xi is a sample extracted from a random
number generator with the same law of X. We treat the Xi as independent
identically distributed random variables;
• then we use the sample mean XN = 1N
∑N
i=1 Xi to approximate E[X].
The steps delineated above are known to produce an unbiased and consistent estimator
XN of the quantity E[X], i.e. thanks to the law of large numbers we have that
lim
N→∞Q
[
XN − E[X]
]
= 0,
and moreover
E
[
XN
]
= E[X].
Further we have that the Monte Carlo error εN := XN − E[X] tends to a normal variable
when N tends to infinity. More precisely thanks to the central limit theorem we have
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that εN converges in distribution to a normal N(0, σ
2
N ) where σ
2 = Var(Xi). In practice
σ is unknown but can be estimated by the sample standard deviation
σN =
√√√√ 1
N− 1
N∑
i=1
(Xi − XN)2.
Thus we can see that our approximation XN converges toward E[X] as 1√N . Other than
increasing the size of the sample N, one can increase the precision of a Monte Carlo
simulation by using for example the method called control variates. To show this method
suppose that we have another random variable Y such that we know E[Y]. Then consider
X∗N = XN + c(YN − E[Y]),
where c is a real parameter and YN is defined similarly to XN. Then it is easy to show
(Glasserman [2004] chapter 4) that X∗N is still a consistent and unbiased estimator for X
and moreover we can choose c = −Cov(X,Y)Var(X) (in practice we will use an estimator of c)
to minimize Var(X∗N). In this case we obtain
Var(X∗N) = (1 − Corr(X, Y)
2)Var(XN).
Thus to benefit from the choice of the new estimator we have to choose Y in such a way
that is strongly correlated to X. Doing so we can reduce the variance of our estimator
and have a more precise estimate of E[Y].
5.1.2 Euler Method
Suppose that we have the following SDE:
dXt = µ(t,Xt)dt+ σ(t,Xt)dWt. (5.1.1)
If we integrate between t and t+ δ we obtain
Xt+δ = Xt +
∫t+δ
t
µ(u,Xu)du+
∫t+δ
t
σ(u,Xu)dWu.
Thus if we want to numerically solve equation (5.1.1) on an equispaced grid t1, . . . ti . . . , tn,
a natural choice will be
Xti+1 = Xti + µ(ti,Xti)(ti+1 − ti) + σ(ti,Xti)(Wti+1 −Wti).
This method is called Euler method. It can be shown that this method produce a good
approximation for the solution to the equation 5.1.1. For more details regarding the
definition of convergence and its order we refer to Kloeden and Platen [1992].
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In our computations we will have to simulate the dynamic of a process satisfying
the following:
dyt = k(µ− y)dt+ ν
√
ytdWC.
Clearly also if we are under conditions that guarantee that yt > 0, this is in general
not true for the Euler discretization, and furthermore a negative yti will stop the Euler
method. Thus following Lord et al. [2010], we use the scheme:
yti+1 = yti + k(µ− y
+
ti
)(ti+1 − ti) + ν
√
y+ti(Wti+1 −Wti).
For more details on this scheme we remand to Lord et al. [2010]. For another way of
discretize the square root diffusion dynamic we refer to Brigo and Mercurio [2007]
chapter 22.
5.1.3 Longstaff-Schwartz Method
Often in pricing derivatives we want to compute E[X | Ft] where Ft is an element of
a given filtration F. We use a method due to Longstaff and Schwartz (Longstaff and
Schwartz [2001]) that consists in approximating the expression E[X|Ft] with
N∑
i
ci(t)fi(t)
where E[X|Ft] =
∑∞
i ci(t)fi(t). In order to do so we use te following:
Theorem 5.1.1. Suppose that X ∈ L2(Ω,A ,Q) then E[X | Ft] is equal to the orthogonal
projection of X on the closed subspace L2(Ω,Ft,Q).
Proof. We start by proving that the subspace L2(Ω,Ft,Q) is indeed closed. Suppose
that we have a convergent sequence of variables Yn ∈ L2(Ω,Ft,Q). Then they converge
in probability and thus we can extract a sub-sequence Ynk that converges almost surely.
Since the Ynk are Ft-measurable and converge almost surely, their limit will also be
Ft-measurable. Thus we proved the closeness of L2(Ω,Ft,Q). Now we have to prove
that E[X | Ft] is the orthogonal projection of X onto L2(Ω,Ft,Q), or in other words
taken Y ∈ L2(Ω,Ft,Q), we want to prove E[(X−E[X |Ft])Y] = 0. To do so we note that
E[(X− E[X | Ft])Y] = E[XY] − E[E[X | Ft])Y] = E[XY] − E[E[XY | Ft])] = 0.
Thus if we can find a base for L2(Ω,Ft,Q) we can truncate it and project X onto it
(e.g. by means of a linear regression) and obtain an approximation of E[X |Ft]. In order
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to obtain a base for L2(Ω,Ft,Q) is convenient to assume that Ft = σ(xt) for a certain
known process. Hence thanks to the Doob-Dynkin Lemma we have that any variable
that is Ft = σ(xt)-measurable is of the form g(xt) for a certain Borel measurable
function g. Thus we can find a base of Ft = σ(xt) = {g(xt) | g is Borel measurable} by
using some known dense subset of the Borel measurable functions (e.g. polynomials).
It is clear now why having a markovian dynamic for the underlying of a derivative
ease the computation. In fact if the price of a derivative is calculated as E[X(ut) | Fs]
for a bounded measurable X(•), then due to the Markov property of ut we have
E[X(ut) | Fs] = E[X(ut) | σ(us)] and thus we can easily apply the previous reasoning
to compute this last expectation.
5.2 From Data to Parameters
In the previous Chapter we described the models we are going to use in this section.
But to have a fully working model it is necessary that it fits the market data. To calibrate
a model to market data we do the following:
• first we select a set of instruments S, the ones that we want our model to be able
to price correctly;
• then we compute the price of the instruments in S as functions of the parameters
of our model;
• next we use a numerical procedure to minimize a certain objective function f
that represents the difference between the market prices and our prices. As an
example if we have a vector of market prices Vmk and a vector of model prices
Vmod we can define f as
∑
i∈S(V
mk − Vmod)2.
• since the function f is a function of the model parameters, then the minimization
procedure gives us a set of parameters that tries to fit as best as possible the
market data.
5.2.1 Calibrating Interest Rate Models
To calibrate interest rate models, the first thing to do is obtaining a term structure for
the risk-free rate. This procedure is called bootstrap and is performed is different ways
whether we assume a multi-curve framework or not.
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Single-Curve Framework
In the case we suppose to be in a single-curve framework, we are assuming that we
price basic interest rate derivatives such as FRA or IRS by non-arbitrage formulas. So
we choose a rate r that has to be taken as a proxy for the risk-free rate and we will base
our non arbitrage formula on this rate. To be precise, in a single-curve framework, we
have that the prices of instruments which have a linear payoff, e.g. FRA and IRS, can
be expressed in terms of zero coupon bonds with underlying rate r. The purpose of
an interest rate model is to obtain prices for non quoted interest rate contracts. But
these contracts must be priced coherently with the already quoted ones, so that no
arbitrage opportunity arises. So the first step to calibrate our model is to closely match
the prices of some basic quoted instrument. To achieve this is important that we can
price correctly some basic instrument such as FRA or IRS. Since these contracts have
a linear payoff pricing them correctly is equivalent to correctly price the zero coupon
bonds that make up their prices. In order to do this, first we need to find the market
prices of zero coupon bonds. This procedure is called bootstrap, and it works as follows:
• first we choose certain dates T1, . . . Ti . . . , Tn that are called pillars (usually Tn is
chosen to be 30/40 years in the future). We will obtain market prices for zero
coupon bonds of the type P(0, Ti);
• since zero coupon bonds with long maturities are not a liquid product, we can
find prices P(0, Ti) on the market only for certain Ti;
• to obtain the others we can resort to IRS; swaps in fact typically have longer matu-
rities than zero coupon bonds. So suppose that we have prices P(0, T1) . . .P(0, Tj)
and we have a swap with maturity Tj+1 whose payments dates are T1, . . . , Tj+1.
We have that the price of the swap is
IRS
j+1
0 = N
(
P(0, Tj+1) − P(0, T1) +
j+1∑
i=2
(Ti − Ti−1)KP(0, Ti)
)
,
and since we can observe the price IRSj+10 on the market and we have the values
P(0, T1), . . . ,P(0, Tj), then we can obtain P(0, Tj+1);
• once we have the prices P(0, T1), . . . ,P(0, Tn) we use an interpolation method to
obtain P(0, T) for T ∈ [0, Tn]. The interpolation can be performed directly on the
P(0, T1), . . . ,P(0, Tn) or on the spot rates R(0, T1), . . . ,R(0, Tn).
The procedure we just illustrated is a simplified version of what is in practice done
on the markets but it gives an idea on how from a discrete set of zero-coupon prices
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(often embedded in other products) we can derive an abstract structure such as a curve
T → P(0, T).
Now suppose that we want to calibrate a G2++ model to market data. We first
want to be able to replicate the prices of zero coupon bonds that we derived via the
bootstrap procedure illustrated above. In the G2++ model the fit to the zero coupon
curve T 7→ P(0, T) is guaranteed. More precisely the curve can be viewed as an input of
the model since for the deterministic shift ϕ(T) we have (see Corollary 4.2.4) :
ϕ(T) =
∂log(PM(0, T))
∂T
+
σ2
2a2
(1 − e−aT )2 +
η2
2b2
(1 − e−bT )2
+ ρ
ση
ab
(1 − e−aT )(1 − e−bT ),
(5.2.1)
So if we define the deterministic shift as we just shown then the fit to the zero
coupon curve is guaranteed. This fit guarantees a good fit for every interest rate product
that has a linear payoff. Thus to calibrate the remaining model parameters we have to
resort to some quoted instrument with non linear payoff.
Definition 5.2.1. A swaption with maturity S, tenor T and strike K is a contract that gives
the buyer the opportunity but not the obligation to enter an IRS at time S that lasts T
years with fixed rate K.
Swaptions, are sensitive to the short rate volatility as stock options are sensitive to
the underlying stock volatility. For more details we refer to Brigo and Mercurio [2007].
Thus what we do to calibrate the model is to choose a set O of swaptions with different
tenors, maturities and strikes. Then we compute the prices of these swaptions as a
function of the model parameters P(a,b, ρ,σ,η). After that we minimize a function that
is increasing in the difference between the observed market prices Pmkt and the model
prices P(a,b, ρ,σ,η). One example of such a function is
∑
i∈O(P
mkt
i − Pi(a,b, ρ,σ,η))
2.
Remark 5.2.2. We note that for the calibration procedure we can use an analytic formula
to price swaptions in the G2++ model as shown in Brigo and Mercurio [2007]. This
formula is nice because it does not involve the shift function ϕ so we can calibrate our
model without knowing it.
Multi-curve-Framework
In the multi-curve case the bootstrap procedure differs slightly from the single-curve
setup (see Ametrano and Bianchetti [2009] or Henrard [2014]). We start from the
collateral curve common to all interest-rate products, which plays the role of the risk-
free curve. Then we bootstrap a zero coupon curve for this rate using only instruments
that have the chosen rate as underlying (e.g. if we do not choose the LIBOR as risk-free
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rate we can’t use IRS whose floating leg pays the LIBOR rate). Once we obtained
a risk-free term structure T 7→ P(0, T) we need to know the forward rates F(0, T , x)
implied by the market. In fact consider our HJM multi-curve model illustrated in
the previous chapter. We shown that we have to provide this model with the market
curves T 7→ fM(0, T) and T 7→ Fx(0, T , x). From the collateral curve we can obtain
the instantaneous forward rate, while for the forward rates of tenor x we proceed
as following. We fix a tenor x and we choose products, such as FRA or IRS, whose
underlying is the same forward rate we are interested into. For example we can’t use a
swap that pays a 3-month LIBOR rate to obtain the curve for the 6-month LIBOR rate.
This because a multi-curve framework acknowledges that there is a spread, called basis,
between those two rates, i.e. lending money for 6 months is not equal to roll a three
month loan. After we have have chosen a set of instruments we proceed as follows:
• first we choose the pillar dates T1, . . . Ti . . . , Tn. We will obtain market forward
rates of the type F(0, Ti, x);
• as starting instruments to obtain the forward curve, we use FRA, since they are
liquidly traded and have relatively short maturities. Next we turn to IRS to
obtain forward rates for later dates. We stress again that we cannot use standard
bond-equivalence-based pricing formulas to obtain the value of IRS as a function
of forward rates. Instead, we have to use formulas like the ones presented in
Ametrano and Bianchetti [2009], Mercurio [2009].
• once we have the prices F(0, T1, x), . . . , F(0, Tn, x) we use an interpolation method
to obtain F(0, T , x) for T ∈ [0, Tn].
Now that we have both the curves T 7→ F(0, T , x) and T 7→ f(0, T), what remains to
do is to calibrate the other parameters. To do this we again resort to swaptions. This
is due to the fact that they have a non linear payoff and their price is affected by the
volatility structure. So we choose a set O of swaptions with different tenors, maturities
and strikes and we compute the prices of these swaptions as a function of the model
parameters. Then as we did in the single-curve framework we minimize the difference
between the market prices and the model ones.
5.2.2 Calibrating Credit Models
Suppose we are considering an entity C and we model its default by a stopping time
τC. Further suppose that we already have an interest rate model calibrated t market
data with short rate rt. In analogy to what we do with interest rate models, in credit
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models we have to bootstrap default probabilities. To do so we need some product that
embeds these quantities in its price.
Definition 5.2.3. A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a contract that can be bought in order
to gain protection against the default of an underlying entity. The protection buyer
A agrees to pay a fee R to the protection seller B at certain times T1, . . . , Tn until the
underlying entity C defaults. In exchange B agrees to pay a certain amount L to A in
case the reference entity C defaults in the interval [T1, Tn]. Usually at inception the fee
R is chosen so that the value of the CDS equals zero.
From th definition we obtain that from B’s perspective, the discounted payoff for a
CDS is
1{T1<τC6Tn}D(0, τC, r)L−1{T1<τC6Tn}D(0, τc, r)(τC−Tβ)R−
n∑
i=2
D(0, Ti, r)(Ti−Ti−1)R1{τ>Ti},
where Tβ is the last Ti preceding τC, and the second term in the payoff expression
represents the accrued rate at default. We approximate (as in Brigo and Mercurio [2007]
Chapter 21) this payoff postponing the payment of L to Tβ+1 thus obtaining
n∑
i=2
D(0, Ti)
(
1{Ti−1<τC6Ti}L− 1{τC>Ti}(Ti − Ti−1)R
)
If we value this contract, under the assumption of independence between default times
and interest rates, we obtain:
CDS0 =
n∑
i=2
E
[
D(0, Ti)1{Ti−1<τC6Ti}
]
L− E
[
1{τC>Ti}
]
(Ti − Ti−1)R
=
n∑
i=2
P(0, Ti)E
[
1{Ti−1<τC6Ti}
]
L− E
[
1{τC>Ti}
]
(Ti − Ti−1)R
=
n∑
i=2
P(0, Ti)Q [Ti−1 < τC 6 Ti]L−Q [τC > Ti] (Ti − Ti−1)R
=
n∑
i=2
P(0, Ti) (Q [τC > Ti−1] −Q [τ > Ti])L−Q [τC > Ti] (Ti − Ti−1)R.
Thus is clear that we can obtain a term structure for survival probabilities from CDS
data as we do for zero coupon from IRS data. The independence assumption is a good
approximation, for pricing CDS, also in the case interest rates and default are correlated.
For example see the credit chapters in Brigo and Alfonsi [2005].
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So now that we have a term structure for survival/default probabilities we can
show how to fit a particular model, in this case CIR++ to market data. Suppose that τC
is generated by a Cox process such that the intensity λCt follows a CIR++ model
λC(t) = yC(t) +ψC(t),
dyCt = kC(µC − y
C
t )dt+ νC
√
yCt dWC.
It should be clear from the CIR++ section that this model, thanks to the function ψ(t),
will automatically fit the probabilities term structures in the same way a G2++ model
fits the zero coupon term structure. Thus we have to choose the other parameters
kC,µC,νC. This is done in an heuristic way since the market does not trade liquidly
single name options (in other words we do not have a liquidly traded equivalent of
swaptions in the credit market). We remind that even if we choose the parameters in
an heuristic way this still guarantees a perfect fit for the default probabilities. Moreover
the other parameters kC,µC,νC will not influence the price of any product in which
the default aspect enters only by the default/survival probabilities.
5.3 Numerical Results
In this section we illustrate the results we obtained through numerical simulation both
in a single-curve and a multi-curve framework to evaluate the impact of the different
valuation adjustments seen in Chapter 2. The interest rate derivative we are considering
is a 10 notional interest rate swap, with ten years maturity. The floating leg pays a
6-month EURIBOR rate two times per year. We suppose that the fixed leg pays annually
and is chosen so that the swap at inception has zero value, or more precisely V0 = 0.
Further we suppose that a defaultable party I enters our IRS as a receiver and we name
its counterparty C. This means that in our perspective (I’s) we are receiving the fixed
rate and paying the floating rate. We model the default times of both parties by means
of a Cox processes with stochastic intensities given by λIt and λ
C
t . We suppose the
usual setup involving the default free filtration F and the default aware one G. We
assume that the defaults are conditionally independent with respect to F. Moreover we
suppose to have a model for a short risk-free rate et, this model will be specified in
the following sections. To model the aforementioned stochastic intensities we use two
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CIR++ models, i.e
λIt = z
I
t(t) +ψ
I(t),
dzIt = k
I(µI − zIt)dt+ ν
I
√
yItdW
1
t ,
λCt = z
C
t (t) +ψ
C(t),
dzCt = k
C(µC − zCt )dt+ ν
C
√
yCt dW
2
t .
The parameters in these equation (Tables 5.1, 5.2) are taken from the articles Brigo et al.
[2013a] and Brigo and Pallavicini [2014]. They represent an high-risk counterparty (C)
and a mid-risk one (I).
zI0 k
I µI νI
0.01 0.8 0.02 0.2
Table 5.1: Mid-risk intensity modeling parameters
zC0 k
C µC νC
0.03 0.5 0.05 0.5
Table 5.2: High-risk intensity modeling parameters
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Figure 5.1: Plot of the medium intensity as a continuously compounded spot rate,
ζIt = ln
(
E
[
e−
∫t
0 λ
I
udu
])
(in blue), along with some quantiles from the distribution of
ln
(
e−
∫t
0 λ
I
udu
)
as functions of time t.
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Figure 5.2: Plot of the high intensity as a continuously compounded spot rate,
ζCt = ln
(
E
[
e−
∫t
0 λ
C
udu
])
(in blue), along with some quantiles from the distribution of
ln
(
e−
∫t
0 λ
C
udu
)
as functions of time t.
In Figures 5.2 and 5.1 we show the representation of the default intensities as a
continuously compounded spot rate along with some quantiles from the distributions
of λIt and λ
C
t . More precisely we plot ζ
I
t and ζ
C
t such that ζ
X
t = ln
(
E
[
e−
∫t
0 λ
X
udu
])
for
X ∈ {I,C}.
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We want to use our default model to compute the price:
V = V0
− E
[∫T
0
(λCu + λ
I
u)D(0,u+ δ, e+ λ
I + λC)
(
Vu+δ −Qu+δ +
∫u+δ
u
D(u+ δ, s, e)dpis
)
du
]
− E
[∫T
0
(λCu + λ
I
u(1 −D(u,u+ δ, λ
C)))D(0,u+ δ, e+ λI + λC)LGDC(Qu+δ −Mu −NCu)
+du
]
+ E
[∫T
0
(λIu + λ
C
u(1 −D(u,u+ δ, λ
I)))D(0,u+ δ, e+ λI + λC)LGDI(Qu+δ −Mu −NIu)
−du
]
.
(5.3.1)
We assume a constant value (0.6) for LGDI and LGDC. Moreover we suppose
Qu+δ = Eu+δ
[∫T
u
D(u+ δ, s, e)dpis
]
= Vu+δ +
∫u+δ
u
D(u+ δ, s, e)dpiu,
thus the first term in equation (5.3.1) vanishes. Further we assume
Mu = αVu = αEu
[∫T
u
D(u, s, e)dpis
]
,
where α ∈ [0, 1]. For the initial margin in the single-curve framework, following Brigo
and Pallavicini [2014], we choose
NCu = Φ
−1
0,νu(q),
where Φµ,ν is the cumulative distribution of a normal variable with mean µ and
standard deviation ν under the risk neutral measure Q. In our case we choose:
µ = 0, νu = Var[Qu+δ | Fu].
The choice of initial margin modeling in a multi-curve framework will be a subject for
further research. We suppose that NIu = −NCu being zero in the CCP trading case. This
choice of initial margin is due to the fact that this specification tries to approximate
(Brigo and Pallavicini [2014]):
inf {x > 0 | Q[Qu+δ −Mu < x | Fu] > q} .
We want to solve equation (5.3.1) in both a single-curve setup and a multi-curve setup
by extending the results of the previous literature usually focused on single-curve
models, except for the analysis of Pallavicini and Brigo [2013] and Crépey et al. [2013] .
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5.3.1 Single Curve Modeling
In the single-curve setup we assume that our risk-free interest rate is the EONIA rate,
and we model it by means of a G2++ process, i.e.
et = xt + yt +ϕ(t),
dxt = −axt dt+ σdW
3
t ,
dyt = −byt dt+ ηdW
4
t ,
dW3tdW
4
t = ρdt
Where the parameters (Table 5.3) are taken again from the articles Brigo et al. [2013a]
and Brigo and Pallavicini [2014].
a b σ η ρ
1.5× 10−4 7.663 0.008 0.0182 0.9733
Table 5.3: G2++ modeling parameters
Further more we follow Brigo and Pallavicini [2014] in modeling the correlation
between the Brownian motion of the rate and the ones of the intensities as follows. We
define the matrix
C =

1 0 ρA ρA
0 1 ρB ρB
ρA ρB 1 ρ
ρA ρB ρ 1

So that dWitdW
j
t = Ci,jdt. We define
ρA = ρI
√
σ2 + η2 + 2σηρ
(σ+ η)
and
ρB = ρC
√
σ2 + η2 + 2σηρ
(σ+ η)
,
where ρC and ρI are the correlations between the whole short rate process and the
default intensities of I and C respectively (they are free parameters that we can variate).
Remark 5.3.1. In practice, to generate correlated Brownian motions we first start by
generating a vector of independent ones, Z. Then we correlate them via the desired
correlation matrix. More precisely if C is the desired correlation matrix we find a
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Cholesky decomposition, i.e. a lower triangular matrix L such that C = LL∗, and then we
define a new vector of Brownian motions W = LZ.
In Figure 5.3 we have a graph of the mean positive and negative part of the value
Vu of the considered IRS as time changes. This can be interpreted as the value of
the potential positive and negative exposure (i.e. the amount that can be loosed (or
gained) in an investment) of I to C. We note that as one can imagine the value has
discontinuities at the payment dates.
ρC ρI V 160K V 320K V 640K V 1M
-0.6 0 -216(3) -215(2) -216(2) -219(1)
-0.4 0 -115(3) -115(2) -116(1) -119(1)
-0.2 0 -32(2) -32(1) -32(1) -34(1)
0 0 38(2) 38(1) 37(1) 34(<1)
0.2 0 93(2) 93(1) 93(1) 92(<1)
0.4 0 136(2) 136(1) 136(1) 134(<1)
0.6 0 166(1) 166(1) 165(1) 165(<1)
Table 5.4: V (and Monte Carlo error) in case of an uncollateralized deal for different
numbers of simulated paths. Moreover we put δ = 0. Values are in basis points.
ρC ρI V 160K V 320K
-0.6 -0.6 -306(3) -306(2)
-0.4 -0.4 -180(3) -180(2)
-0.2 -0.2 -65(3) -65(2)
0 0 38(2) 38(1)
0.2 0.2 130(2) 130(1)
0.4 0.4 211(2) 211(1)
0.6 0.6 284(1) 285(1)
Table 5.5: V (and Monte Carlo error) in case of an uncollateralized deal for different
numbers of simulated paths. Moreover we put δ = 0. Values are in basis points.
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Figure 5.3: Single-curve framework: positive and negative part of the exposure Vu
(y-axes), as a function of u.
5.3.2 Single Curve Results
We start analyzing Tables 5.4 and 5.5. In this case we have a simple deal without
collateralization and furthermore we are not modeling any cure period for the default,
i.e. we suppose δ = 0 and for simplicity we put LGDI = LGDC = 0.6. Our findings
agree with the results of Brigo et al. [2011b], in fact we note that the impact of correlation
between the interest rate and the default intensities is relevant. More precisely keeping
ρI = 0 and increasing ρC from 0 we have that the price of the IRS grows. In fact being
the correlation positive between C default intensity and the rates, we have that high
interest rates correspond to higher default intensity. This causes the CVA term to lower
its value, in fact
CVA = Et[1{τ<T}1{τ=τC}D(t, τ, r)(LGDC)(Vτ)
+],
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where Vτ is the value of a receiver swap starting in τ. Since the CVA term is similar
to a receiver swaption, we have that its value will decrease if the interest rate increase.
So in the cases where the indicator functions of the CVA term are more likely to be
non null, i.e. when we have a higher default intensity, then also the interest rate will be
high, thus diminishing the CVA term. Since this term has to be subtracted from the
quantity V0 −DVA to obtain V0 this explains the behavior found in Table 5.4. In Table
5.5 we report the prices computed when ρI change accordingly to ρC. In this case we
see that the effect is bigger, because increasing ρI increase in absolute value the DVA
term (which is negative), thus increasing the final value.
We also valued the same deal under a variation margin collateralization and as
shown in Figure 5.4 it is clear that the presence of collateral diminish the need of any
value adjustment. The collateral is modeled as Mt =u for various values of α. As we
see in case of perfect collateralization (α = 1) we have that the valuation adjustments
vanish. This is due to the fact that in an interest rate swap there is no jump at default in
the value of the product and then the collateral can perfectly match the value process.
Figure 5.4: Single-curve framework: impact of variation margin αVu =
αEu
[∫T
uD(u, s, e)dpis
]
on the valuation adjustments as a function of α. The picture
refers to the case ρC = ρI = 0 and no cure period, i.e δ = 0. In red we have V , while
the other lines represent CVA and DVA. Values are in basis points.
In Figure 5.5 we see how the presence of a cure period (δ = 10 days in the figure)
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diminishes the effectiveness of the variation margin. Thus we also introduced initial
margins and the impact on the valuation adjustments is shown in Figure 5.6, for α = 1
and different choice of the quantiles in the initial margin definition. We can see how
the introduction of initial margin has a big impact on the valuation adjustments.
Figure 5.5: Single-curve framework: impact of variation margin αVu, without initial
margins, on the valuation adjustments as a function of α. The picture refers to the case
ρC = ρI = 0 and cure period of δ = 10 days. In red we have V , while the other lines
represent CVA and DVA. Values are in basis points.
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Figure 5.6: Single-curve framework: impact of initial margin NCu = Φ
−1
0,νu(q), N
I
u =
−NCu on the valuation adjustments as a function of the quantile q. In red we have V ,
while the other lines represent CVA and DVA.
Single Curve Model Checking
In this section we show the analysis we performed to check some modeling assumptions.
In particular we want to verify that the Longstaff-Schwartz method to retrieve the
conditional expectations that appear in the various valuation adjustments is working as
expected.
As we have seen at the beginning of the chapter to apply this method to calcu-
late Vu we basically have to choose a truncated basis of L2(Ω,Fu,Q) and regress∫T
uD(u, s, e)dpis onto it. Since our rate is a markovian process we can substitute Fu
with σ(xu,yu). We choose a polynomial base in the variables xu,yu as a base for
L2(Ω,Fu,Q). We tried different cardinalities for our truncated base B and we show
the plot of the coefficients of the regression on each of the truncated bases we tried in
Figures 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11.
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Figure 5.7: Single-curve framework: regression coefficients over time for the Longstaff-
Schwartz algorithm. Here we show coefficients for 1, xu,yu in the case #B = 6
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Figure 5.8: Single-curve framework: regression coefficients over time for the Longstaff-
Schwartz algorithm. Here we show coefficients for xuyu, x2u,y2u in the case #B = 6
What we have seen is that if we choose B = 1, xt,yt, xtyt, x2t,y
2
t the coefficients of
the terms xtyt,y2t have a lot of noise as can be seen from Figure 5.8. Thus we first
used B = 1, xt,yt, xtyt, x2t (Figures 5.9, 5.10) and then B = 1, xt,yt, x
2
t. There were no
significant changes in the computed prices so we deduce that the terms y2t, xtyy were
indeed unnecessary. The reason may rely in the parameters of the model, in fact we see
that the yt factor does not have a big impact on the et dynamic since its drift coefficient
(a = 1.5× 10−4) is small if compared with the xt drift (b = 7.663). Moreover yt is also
very correlated with xt (ρ = 0.9733).
Remark 5.3.2. We note that the value of the coefficients, if not disturbed by the noise, is
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influenced by the payment dates. In fact we can see that at these dates the coefficient
jumps, coherently with what we expect, since the coefficients represent a projection of
the value Vu over a truncate polynomial basis of L2(Ω,Fu,Q).
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Figure 5.9: Single-curve framework: regression coefficients over time for the Longstaff-
Schwartz algorithm. Here we show coefficients for 1, xu,yu in the case #B = 5
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Figure 5.10: Single-curve framework: regression coefficients over time for the Longstaff-
Schwartz algorithm. Here we show coefficients for xuyu, x2u in the case #B = 5
87
5.3. Numerical Results
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−0.6
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
t
1 coefficient
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−100
−90
−80
−70
−60
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
t
path_x coefficient
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
t
path_y coefficient
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
t
path_x2 coefficient
Figure 5.11: Single-curve framework: regression coefficients over time for the Longstaff-
Schwartz algorithm. Here we show coefficients for 1, xx,u yu, x2u in the case #B = 4
5.3.3 Multi-Curve Framework
In the multi-curve setup we assume the EONIA rate as our risk-free rate et = f(t, t),
and we further model the underlying of our IRS, i.e. the 6m- EURIBOR rate Ft(T , x)
where x =6m. To do so we use the stochastic volatility HJM model we illustrated in the
previous chapter and since we only have to model two rates, we choose N = 2, more
precisely we set
df(t, T) =σ∗t(T)
[∫T
t
σt(u)du dt+ dW
3
t
]
, (5.3.2)
dFt(T , x)
k(T , x) + Ft(T , x)
=Σ∗t(T , x)
[∫T
t
σt(u)du dt+ dW
4
t
]
, (5.3.3)
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where we suppose
σt(T) =σt(T , T , 0, )
Σt(T , x) =
∫T
T−x
σt(u, T , x)du,
σt(u, T , x) =h(t)q(u, T , x)g(t,u),
g(t,u) = exp
(
−
∫u
t
λ(y)dy
)
.
We go further modeling a squared root diffusion shape for the volatility h
k(T , x) =
e−γx
x
,
ht =
√
Vtσˆ,
dVt = k(1 − Vt)dt+ ε
√
VtdW
5
t ,
V0 = v,
gi(t, T) = e−λ
i(T−t),
qij(u, T , x) = eη
ix1{i=j}.
(5.3.4)
The parameters (Table 5.6) are obtained by the article Moreni and Pallavicini [2013]. We
remind that since we choose N = 2:
• σˆ is a constant 2× 2 diagonal matrix with non null elements σ1,σ2;
• k, θ, ε, v are positive constants;
• λ,η are constant 2-dimensional vectors.
λ1 λ2 σ1 σ2 v
1.3503 0.0207 0.0232 0.0106 1.1270
k ε η1 η2 γ
0.0584 0.8554 1.3339 0 -0.0123
Table 5.6: Multi-curve HJM modeling parameters
Remark 5.3.3. Here, as in Moreni and Pallavicini [2013], we are considering a normalized
dynamic of the volatility process. In fact we choose the mean reversion level to be 1.
This does not change the model, since the mean reversion level is now embedded in k.
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To model the correlations between rates, volatility process and intensities we build
a matrix
C =

1 0 ρA ρA ξρI
0 1 ρB ρB ξρC
ρA ρB 1 ρ3,4 ρ3,5
ρA ρB ρ3,4 1 ρ4,5
ξρI ξρC ρ3,5 ρ4,5 1

such that dWitdW
j
t = Ci,jdt. The elements of the matrix are defined as follows:
• ρ3,4 ρ3,5 ρ4,5 are obtained from the calibration (see Table 5.7);
• ρC and ρI are free parameters that model the correlation between the whole short
rate process and the default intensities of I and C respectively;
• ρA = ρI
√
σ2+η2+2σηρ
(σ+η) ;
• ρB = ρC
√
σ2+η2+2σηρ
(σ+η) ;
• ξ is a parameter obtained numerically to make C positive definite.
Remark 5.3.4. It is worth noticing that we choose the matrix C so that is a general version
of the single-curve matrix.
ρ3,4 ρ3,5 ρ4,5
-0.9050 0.1531 0.2597
Table 5.7: Calibrated correlation coefficients for the HJM model
5.3.4 Multi-Curve Results
We start reporting a comparison between the prices obtained by the G2++ of the
previous section and the HJM model of this section, calibrated to the same data of the
G2++. More precisely we choose the single-curve setting relative to Table 5.4 and we
calibrate a constant volatility variation of our HJM model to it. We expect to obtain
similar results since as we already mentioned, in case of constant volatility the described
HJM model reduces to a G2++ one. Indeed it’s the case as we can see from Table 5.8.
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ρI ρC G2++ V 40K HJM V 40K HJM V 30K
0 -0.6 -220.9(6.7) -209.2(6.6) -222.9(7.8)
0 -0.4 -121.2(5.8) -112.9(5.7) -120.9(6.7)
0 -0.2 -34.5(4.9) -29(4.8) -36(5.7)
0 0 37(4.1) 40.7(4.1) 34.5(4.9)
0 0.2 93.2(3.4) 95.8(3.5) 92.5(4.1)
0 0.4 136.8(2.9) 138.7(3.0) 137.1(3.5)
0 0.6 166.6(2.5) 168.2(2.6) 167.6(3.0)
Table 5.8: Comparison between G2++ prices and HJM prices with constant volatility.
We next illustrate the results obtained with an HJM model with square root diffusion
volatility process calibrated to the data of Moreni and Pallavicini [2013](note that these
data are different from the ones used until now). In Tables 5.9, 5.10 we report the prices
of our IRS in the case of an uncollateralized deal, without taking into account a cure
period. We can see the same pattern observed for the G2++ model and thus the results
agree on the impact of correlation on the value adjustments.
ρI ρC HJM results 30K
0 -0.5 -92.2(6.7)
0 -0.25 -68.9(6.5)
0 0 -38.6(6.1)
0 0.25 -2(5.6)
0 0.5 36.7(5)
Table 5.9: V (and Monte Carlo error) in case of an uncollateralized deal for different
numbers of simulated paths. Moreover we put δ = 0. Value are in basis points.
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ρI ρC HJM results 30K
-0.3 -0.3 -117.9(6.3)
-0.15 -0.15 -80.8(6.2)
0 0 -38.6(6.1)
0.15 0.15 7.5(5.9)
0.3 0.3 56.5(5.8)
Table 5.10: V (and Monte Carlo error) in case of an uncollateralized deal for different
numbers of simulated paths. Moreover we put δ = 0. Value are in basis points.
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Figure 5.12: Multi-curve framework with stochastic volatility: regression coefficients
over time for the Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm. Here we show coefficients for
1,X1t,X
2
t,Vt.
Multi-Curve Model Checking
As in the single-curve framework, we investigate some modeling assumptions.
We want to analyze the Lonstaff-Schwartz procedure also in this multi-curve stochas-
tic volatility context. This time thanks to the markovian structure of the model we have
Ft = σ(X1t,X
2
t,Vt) where X
1
t,X
2
t,Vt are defined as in formulas (4.5.3) and (5.3.4). Thus
we use B = {1,X1t,X
2
t,Vt,X
1
tX
2
t,X
1
tVt,X
2
tVt, (X
1)2t, (X
2)2t, (V)
2
t}. The obtained coefficient
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can be seen in Figures 5.12 and 5.13. It seems that (V)2t has low impact since its
coefficient is very small, moreover also the coefficient of Vt s very noisy. This may
depend from the fact that we are pricing a product (an IRS) that is not very sensitive to
interest rate volatility.
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Figure 5.13: Multi-curve framework with stochastic volatility: regression coefficients
over time for the Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm. Here we show coefficients for
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Conclusions and Further
Developments
In this thesis we provided an analysis of the pricing of defaultable claims in a multi-
curve interest rate framework, deriving pricing formulas accounting for realistic contract
specifications. Moreover, we thoroughly tested numerically the impact of the aforemen-
tioned formulas to the pricing of an interest rate swap. The analysis of default risk in a
realistic multi-curve framework isn’t common in the literature, which usually resorts to
simple single-curve models, and our findings highlights differences and analogies in
these two frameworks for what concerns defaultable contract pricing.
In the first chapter we described both the structural and the reduced for approach
to default modeling, and we proved the technical results exploited in the following
chapters.
In the second chapter we briefly described the martingale pricing theory and
extended it to handle default risk. Then we introduced the fundamental concept of
Total Valuation Adjustment (i.e. an adjustment to the risk-free price of a contract that
account for counterparty risk) and derived a formula for its computation.
In the third chapter we detailed some of the most popular market practices such as
closeout valuation, general collateral margining and clearing through Central Counter-
parties. We also derived a more general version of the pricing formula of chapter 2,
that accounts for the cure period, i.e. time needed to perform the default procedures.
In the fourth chapter we gave an overview of interest rate modeling both in a
single-curve and a multi-curve framework.
In the fourth chapter we gave an overview of interest rate modeling both in a
single-curve and a multi-curve framework.
In the final chapter we detailed the numerical procedures we used for pricing an
interest rate swap and we commented extensively the implications of our numerical
findings both in a standard single-curve framework and in a more realistic multi-curve
one.
As possible perspectives of the current work, we plan to test numerically in the multi-
curve setting how the splitting of the collateral account in two components, a variation
margin and an initial margin, impacts on the level of the valuation adjustments.
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Another natural development is the inclusion of funding costs, i.e. to model the
way the bank finances and hedges its trades. This means accounting for the fact that
the bank will generally pay a spread over the risk-free rate to fund itself, and for the
fact that borrowing or lending do not happen at the same rate. This aspect furthermore
poses some interesting questions on how to adapt non-arbitrage pricing theory. Two
important works regarding inclusion of funding costs are Brigo et al. [2013b] and Crépey
et al. [2014]. Another way to extend our work is to include multiple currencies in a
default aware multi-curve framework, an almost uncharted research area. Finally, two
further possibilities include the analysis of non F-predictable payoffs, such as CDS
(Brigo et al. [2014], Crépey et al. [2014]) or the inclusion in our theoretical and numerical
settings of more sophisticated multi-curve specifications (for instance refer to Cuchiero
et al. [2014] for the most recent modeling achievements).
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